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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of personalized pricing on distribution chan-
nels. We explore whether a brand manufacturer prefers to sell through its own
direct channel only (mono distribution) or through an independent retailer as well
(dual distribution). Compared with uniform pricing, personalized pricing allows
for higher rent extraction but also leads to fiercer intra-brand competition. The lat-
ter can however be mitigated through the wholesale contract. As a result, if the
two channels are horizontally differentiated, or vertically differentiated with the
independent retailer offering the high-end product, dual distribution is optimal
under both personalized and uniform pricing. By contrast, if the manufacturer of-
fers the high-end product, mono distribution can be optimal under personalized
pricing even if the retailer broadens the demand of the manufacturer’s product.
Instead, with uniform pricing, selling through both channels is always optimal.
We also show that industry profits may be the largest in a hybrid pricing regime,
in which the manufacturer forgoes the use of personalized pricing and only the re-
tailer charges personalized prices. Our results are able to explain the distribution
channels observed in different industries.
Keywords: personalized pricing, distribution channels, dual distribution, ver-
tical contracting, downstream competition.
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1 Introduction
The growing use of the Internet and advances in information technologies enable firms
to gather unprecedented volumes of consumer data. This has led to important changes
in their pricing policies, by allowing them to practice price discrimination at finely-
tuned levels. For example, firms tailor their prices according to consumers’ purchase
history, their physical location, the device they are using, their online search behavior,
their social network activity, and so on.1 Tanner (2014) reports that buyers using a
discount site, such as Nextag.com, receive prices as much as 23% lower than direct vis-
itors. Large Internet stores, such as Amazon and Staples, vary their prices according
to customers’ geographic locations by up to 166%. Firms often implement this differ-
entiated pricing through coupons and specific promotions, thereby moving closer to
personalized pricing.
At the same time, technological advances have made possible the entry of new on-
line retail companies. For example, in the apparel industry, the British company Asos
(founded in 2000) sells several thousand products with a revenue of around £2.5 bn in
2018. In the food industry, iHerb (founded in 1996) distributes over 30,000 nutritional
and organic food products. A core question for brand manufacturers is whether or not
to sell their products through these independent retail outlets. For example, although
Asos sells more than 850 brands, Prada or Louis Vuitton products cannot be found
there. Similarly, iHerb sells coffee of several brands but the organic coffee and food
producer Equal Exchange sells exclusively through its own stores. This question is rel-
evant beyond online markets. For example, the advancement of wireless technology
has allowed mobile virtual network operators, such as Ting or Lycamobile, to enter
the market for mobile phone services without rolling out their own networks. Estab-
lishedmobile operators were confronted with the issue of whether or not to grant these
virtual operators access to their networks.2
These independent firms bring value to the industry by broadening the customer
base. For example, the manufacturer and the independent retailers may offer different
services (e.g., professional advice vs. lower transaction costs). This generates hori-
zontal differentiation, as different consumer groups may favor different services. Al-
ternatively, the firms may be vertically differentiated. In some cases, the manufacturer
caters foremost to the high-end segment. For example, luxury-goods brand manufac-
1For example, according to TRUSTe—a consulting firm on privacy and technological tools—the 100
most widely used sites on the Internet are monitored by more than 1,300 firms. Also, established com-
panies, such as Bloomberg and Axciom or more recent ones such as PubMatic or Freshplum, which
specialize in developing machine learning algorithms, act as data brokers and help firms to predict a
consumer’s willingness-to-pay (The Economist, 2014).
2The telephone industry is one of first industries where firms used customized pricing to a large
extent; see, e.g., Chen and Iyer (2002).
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turers often provide a better shopping experience than independent retailers. In the
case of small and unknown manufacturers selling their products through established
retail outlets, the retailer can instead be the one catering to high-valuation consumers.
Independent retailers however also compete with the manufacturer’s own retail
outlets, and this intra-brand competition may dissipate profits. Both the benefit of dual
distribution, through increased demand, and its costs, through increased competition,
are affected by the possibility of price discrimination. Targeted prices allow for larger
rent extraction, therefore increasing the benefit of demand expansion, but they may
also intensify competition.
These observations suggest that personalized pricing and consumer tracking may
not only affect firms’ pricing strategies but also their distribution strategies. Yet, even
though personalized pricing has received substantial attention in the literature (see
e.g., Shaffer and Zhang, 1995, 2002; Choudhary et al., 2005; Ghose and Huang, 2009),
its interaction with other marketing decisions is not well understood.3
Building on these considerations, the objective of this paper is to identify the im-
plications of price discrimination for manufacturers’ distribution strategies. Does per-
sonalized pricing change the incentives of a manufacturer to sell through an independ-
ent retailer? Is this decision influenced by the type of differentiation between the two
firms? Does the trade-off between fiercer competition and higher rent extraction af-
fect the wholesale contract? Can a firm benefit from forgoing the use of personalized
pricing?
To answer these questions, we set up a simple model with one brand manufacturer
selling directly to final consumers and one independent retailer. The retailer competes
with the manufacturer in the downstream market but also adds value to the industry.
Specifically, the two firms are either horizontally or vertically differentiated, and in the
latter case either the manufacturer or the retailer offers the high-end product.
For each demand pattern, we consider four different scenarios. In the first scen-
ario, the manufacturer and the retailer offer uniform prices to final consumers. This
represents a market in which consumer tracking is not possible. In the second scen-
ario, both firms engage in personalized pricing. This reflects the situation in which
the two firms have highly-frequented (e.g., online) stores allowing them to gather very
precise consumer data.4 In the third scenario, only the manufacturer can set personal-
ized prices. This represents for example a situation in which, thanks to past purchases,
the manufacturer has better consumer data than the retailer. In the fourth scenario,
only the retailer can set personalized prices. This reflects the situation in which a large
3We provide a detailed literature overview in the next section.
4Although personalized pricing is an extreme form, it allows us to highlight the effect of price dis-
crimination on distribution choices in a clear way.
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retailer offers many products and is thereby able to collect more consumer data than
a brand manufacturer. Our analysis therefore captures that new technologies enable
firms to use personalized pricing as a trend but there are different capabilities of doing
so, both at the market and at the firm level. This allows us to answer the question of
how personalized pricing affects channel decisions.
We also consider an extended scenario in which the pricing regime is endogenous
and negotiated by the firms—that is, personalized pricing is available to both firms,
and they negotiate whether each of them adopts it or not.5 This case is particularly
relevant if the bilateral relationship is a substantial part of the business of both firms,
and not just one in a broad portfolio of relationships.
When the pricing regime is given, we first show that dual distribution is always
optimal in the case of horizontal differentiation, and in the case of vertical differenti-
ation when the retailer offers the high-end product. In these scenarios, the firms can
find a wholesale price that is high enough to mitigate retail competition, and still al-
lows the industry to benefit from the value brought by the retailer. For example, in the
case of horizontal differentiation, a wholesale price equal to the willingness-to-pay of
the consumer indifferent between the two firms enables them to segment the market:
the retailer cannot profitably serve the manufacturer’s core market, and conversely the
manufacturer, for which the wholesale price constitutes the opportunity cost of selling
directly to consumers, has no incentive to serve the retailer’s core market. Further-
more, personalized pricing by both firms then leads to a higher industry profit than
any other pricing regime. This result is markedly different from the one obtained for
inter-brand competition between independent firms (e.g., Thisse and Vives, 1988, and
Shaffer and Zhang, 1995), according to which firms are trapped in a prisoner’s di-
lemma and personalized pricing reduces industry profits. In the case of intra-brand
between distribution channels, an appropriate wholesale contract reverses this result.
We then focus on vertical differentiation with the manufacturer offering the high-
end product. We first show that dual distribution remains optimal as long as the man-
ufacturer offers a uniform retail price—regardless of whether the retailer also sets a
uniform price or charges personalized prices. There again, the manufacturer can use
the wholesale price to control the intensity of intra-brand competition to a sufficient ex-
tent, and yet allow the retailer to expand sales in the low-end segment. This enables the
manufacturer to raise its own price and extract more surplus from the high-valuation
consumers.
By contrast, if the manufacturer charges personalized prices, then it may favor
mono distribution (i.e., sell only through its direct channel)— both when the retailer
5The firms can contract on uniform pricing, for instance, by adopting privacy or fair treatment
policies.
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charges a uniform price and when it charges personalized ones. Specifically, relying
exclusively on direct distribution is optimal when the retailer does not substantially
expand demand, as the effect of increased intra-brand competition then dominates
the benefit of expanding demand. For example, when both firms can price discrim-
inate, they can price aggressively in each other’s strong segment without sacrificing
margins in their own core business. As a result, it becomes more difficult to control
intra-brand competition without impeding market expansion. Mono-distribution is
moreover more likely to be optimal when the retailer charges a uniform price, as this
reduces its added value. This finding suggests that channel design and wholesale con-
tracting are crucial for the profitability of personalized pricing.
Our insights can explainwhy brandmanufacturers adopt different channel strategies
across industries. For example, luxury-goods manufacturers such as Prada or Louis
Vuitton often eschew retailers and mostly sell their products in their own stores. Simil-
arly, established mobile network operators have often been reluctant to grant MVNOs
access to their network—prompting regulators to impose such access. These markets
fit the demand pattern ofmanufacturers catering to consumerswith a highwillingness-
to-pay and independent retailers catering to those with a lower willingness-to-pay. By
contrast, in industries like the apparel industry, retailers (e.g., Asos and Zalando) of-
fer services such as next day delivery and/or free return, whereas manufacturers (e.g.,
Burberry or Marc O’Polo) offer professional advice and trying on in their stores. Their
services are thus differentiated horizontally rather than vertically and, in line with our
analysis, manufacturers use both channels.
We then endogenize firms’ pricing policies. Interestingly, we find that it can actu-
ally be profitable for the manufacturer not to use personalized pricing, even if it has the
ability to do so. The industry profit can indeed be largest in a hybrid pricing regime, in
which only the retailer charges personalized prices. Restricting the manufacturer’s pri-
cing policy induces it to focus on its core market, thereby dampening the competitive
pressure and allowing the retailer to extract more surplus. Hence, this hybrid pricing
regime can achieve the right balance between rent extraction (within each channel) and
the avoidance of fierce competition (between channels).
Finally, we show that our main insights carry over to a situation in which the man-
ufacturer can shut down its direct channel. Then, mono distribution by the retailer is
more likely to be optimal if it can charge personalized prices, as it is more valuable in
that case.
We discuss in the conclusion the lessons from our analysis, which may provide
guidance for contracting with pure retailers. A key insight is that price discrimination
and consumer addressability—which is feasible in many modern industries—affects
not only the pricing strategy, but also the optimal distribution network. Indeed, mono
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distribution may then be optimal even when a retailer adds value to the market. The
reason is that competition for final consumers can destroy profits in themanufacturer’s
core market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related liter-
ature. Section 3 presents the model and considers the demand patterns of horizontal
differentiation and of vertical differentiation in which the retailer offers the high-end
product. Section 4 analyzes the demand pattern in which the manufacturer offers the
high-end product. Section 5 endogenizes the choice of the pricing regime. Section 6 ex-
tends the analysis by allowing the manufacturer to shut down its direct channel, and
Section 7 concludes. Formal proofs are provided in the Online Appendix.
2 Related Literature
The literature on competition with price discrimination has almost exclusively focused
on “inter-brand” competition between fully independent firms.6 This literature usu-
ally distinguishes between models of horizontal and vertical differentiation. In their
seminal paper, Thisse and Vives (1988) analyze the effects of price discrimination for
horizontally differentiated firms competing on a Hotelling line. They demonstrate that
this leads to a prisoner’s dilemma: firms adopt price discrimination but profits fall due
to increased competition.7 Shaffer and Zhang (1995) highlight a similar prisoner’s di-
lemma when firms discriminate through coupon targeting and consumers differ in the
cost of redeeming coupons. Chen and Iyer (2002) allow firms to choose the proportion
of consumers for whom they acquire information. In this case, firms may benefit from
consumer addressability and may refrain from acquiring full information. Chen et al.
(2020) allow consumers to bypass price discrimination and buy at a uniform price.
They show that this possibility can collectively harm consumers and allow firms to be-
nefit from price discrimination.8 Montes et al. (2019) obtain a similar result in a model
in which consumers, by incurring a cost for keeping privacy, can prevent firms from
exploiting information about their preferences. They show that a decrease in this cost
may harm consumers and benefit firms.
Choudhary et al. (2005), in one of the first papers introducing the expression “per-
sonalized pricing”, consider instead competition between vertically differentiated firms,
and find that pricing strategies can be non-monotonic in consumer valuations. In ad-
6See Stole (2007) and Zhang (2009) for an overview of different forms of price discrimination and
targeted pricing and how they affect competitive outcomes.
7Liu and Serfes (2013) extend the framework of Thisse and Vives (1988) by studying the effects of
price discrimination in two-sided markets. Matsumura and Matsushima (2015) show instead that firms
may choose not to price discriminate in order to limit rivals’ incentives to engage in cost reduction.
8Shaffer and Zhang (2000) consider asymmetric customer bases and provide conditions under which
a firm may offer a lower price to its own customer base.
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dition, they show that personalized pricing can lead to an increase or a decrease in
quality levels. Two papers combine vertical and horizontal differentiation. Shaffer
and Zhang (2002) show that firms offering higher quality may benefit from personal-
ized pricing, even though competition is fiercer. This is due to a gain in market share,
which dominates the effect of lower prices. Ghose and Huang (2009) consider the case
in which firms can customize product quality according to consumer preferences, and
find that this can make personalized pricing profitable.9
Our paper contributes to this literature by studying the implications of personal-
ized pricing on intra-brand competition, wholesale contracting, and on the choice of
distribution channels. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that also ana-
lyzes the interplay between personalized pricing and the distribution strategy is Liu
and Zhang (2006). They consider a setting in which the retailer has access to personal-
ized pricing and the manufacturer—who charges a linear wholesale tariff—can enter
through direct marketing with a uniform price. They show that the adoption of per-
sonalized pricing harms the retailer by inducing the manufacturer to charge a higher
wholesale price, but can nevertheless be profitable by deterring the manufacturer from
entering the downstream market. Their focus is on the retailer’s pricing strategy and
its implications for downstream entry by the manufacturer. We focus instead on an
integrated manufacturer’s decision to allow a retailer to enter the market, and study
the implications of pricing strategies on this decision. We also allow for personalized
pricing by both firms and consider a non-linear wholesale tariff.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on Internet channel entry (Chiang et
al., 2003; Yoo and Lee, 2011) by determining the conditions under which an incumbent
who directly markets its products deters entry by a pure retailer.10 On a broader level,
our paper establishes that the possibility of price discrimination not only has short-
run effects on competition but also influences other important marketing decisions.
It is therefore in line with Jing (2016) and Li (2018): Jing (2016) shows that behavior-
based pricing affects quality differentiation between firms, and Li (2018) determines
how behavior-based pricing shapes competition between manufacturer-retailer chan-
nels, showing that this crucially depends onwhether only retailers can adopt behavior-
based pricing or manufacturers can do so as well.11
9For empirical papers on how firms can implement personalized pricing, see, for example, Werten-
broch and Skiera (2002) or Elsner et al. (2004). Rossi et al. (1996), Dubé and Misra (2017), and Shiller
(2020), among others, provide estimates for the profitability of personalized pricing relative to uniform
pricing in different set-ups.
10The literature on channel coordination (McGuire and Staelin, 1983; Moorthy, 1987, 1988; Rey and
Stiglitz 1988, 1995) usually focuses on channel coordination without suppliers being able to sell directly
to final consumers.
11Behavior-based price discrimination refers to the practice of charging consumers different prices de-
pendent on their purchase history. For papers analyzing how this affects dynamic pricing, see Acquisti
and Varian (2005) for the monopoly case and, for example, Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole
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Finally, our paper also contributes to the literature on market foreclosure. Sev-
eral papers show that a vertically integrated firm has the incentive to raise wholesale
prices to a non-integrated downstream rival to dampen price competition (see e.g., Sa-
linger, 1988, Ordover et al., 1990, Hart and Tirole, 1990, Chen, 2001, and Bourreau et
al., 2011).12 However, if the rival adds value to the industry, for example, by offering
a differentiated product, foreclosure takes place only partially, as the integrated firm
benefits from entry through the wholesale revenue.13 By contrast, our paper shows
that an integrated firm may fully deny access to its products if price discrimination
downstream is feasible.
3 The Model
3.1 Setting
Supply. A monopoly brand manufacturer, firm A, sells its good through a direct dis-
tribution channel and can also rely on an independent retailer, firm B.14 In order to
highlight the strategic motive for mono or dual distribution, we assume away any
fixed costs of opening a new distribution channel. For simplicity, variable costs are
assumed to be linear and normalized to zero.
Demand. Consumers have heterogeneous preferences over the firms’ offerings. Spe-
cifically, a consumer of type x 2 [0; X] has a willingness-to-pay for the offering of firm
i = A;B (“product i”, thereafter) given by:15
ui (x) = max fri   six; 0g :
Without loss of generality, we suppose that consumers are ranked by decreasing order
of preference for product A: sA > 0, but allow sB to be positive or negative. We do
assume that both products play an effective role. Specifically, letting:
x^  rA   rB
sA   sB
(2000), Zhang (2011), Rhee and Thomadsen (2017), and Choe et al. (2018) for the case of (imperfect)
competition.
12Rey and Tirole (2007) provide an overview of this literature.
13An exception isWeeds (2016) who shows that vertically integrated content providers may fully fore-
close rival distributors due to dynamic considerations. If consumers have switching costs, exclusivity
confers a market share advantage, which is beneficial in the future.
14In Section 6, we also consider the possibility that the manufacturer shuts down its direct channel
and distributes only through the independent retailer.
15ri can be interpreted as consumers’ intrinsic utility for product i, net of the unit costs of production.
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denote the consumer type who receives the same value from both products, and:
u^  sArB   sBrA
sA   sB
denote the corresponding utility, we maintain the following assumptions:
x^ 2 (0; X) and u^ > 0: (1)
The first assumption ensures that no product “dominates” the other. The second as-
sumption ensures that both products offer value to some consumers who have a posit-
ive willingness-to-pay (namely, those with a type close to x^). Together, these assump-
tions ensure that the two products compete for those consumers.
There are thus three possible demand configurations:
 If sB < 0, consumers’ utilities are negatively correlated: consumers who are more
attracted by one product are less attracted by the other one (see Figure 1a). This
corresponds to the pattern commonly observed in classic models of horizontal
differentiation.16
 If instead sB > 0, consumers’ utilities are positively correlated: consumers who
are more attracted by one product are also more attracted by the other. This cor-
responds to the pattern commonly observed in classic models of vertical differenti-
ation, in which consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality, and consumers
who value quality more typically derive greater utility from both products. Con-
sider for example the classic model of Shaked and Sutton (1982), and suppose
that the firm offering the product of higher quality also has higher unit costs.
Then, high-valuation consumers are more profitable for the high-quality firm,
and low-valuation consumers are more profitable for the low-quality firm.17 Two
cases can then arise:
– product A is the “high-end” product, that is, it is favored by high-valuation
consumers. This case occurs when sB 2 (0; sA) (see Figure 1b)—our assump-
tions in (1) then imply rA > rB.
– product B is instead the “high-end” product; this case occurs when sB > sA
(see Figure 1c), implying rB > rA.
16For example, the standard Hotelling model in which consumers with reservation value v are uni-
formly distributed along a unit-length segment and face a transportation cost t corresponds to rA = v,
rB = v   t, sA = t and sB =  t.
17For instance, denote by qi the quality supplied by firm i and the corresponding unit costs ci. Con-
sumers’ valuations are qi, where  is uniformly distributed over [0; 1]. Using firm i’s marginmi = pi ci
as its strategic pricing decision, a classic model of vertical differentiation corresponds to ri = qi   ci,
x = 1   , and si = qi. Indeed, the net utility of consumer type  when buying from firm i is
qi   pi = ui (x) mi, where ui (x) = ri   six.
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These demand configurations reflect the fact that the brand manufacturer and the
retailer usually provide different offers, and consumers’ valuations for these offers
are heterogeneous. Brick-and-mortar stores and, sometimes, the websites of brand
manufacturers allow customers to obtain professional advice from trained salespeople
and free testing of the product. Online retailers offer instead lower transaction costs
(e.g., due to one-click shopping), free return policies, and allow customers to see valu-
able user feedback (see e.g., Acquisti and Varian, 2005). The various configurations
discussed above correspond to different industries. Horizontal differentiation arises
when customers with a similar willingness-to-pay for the manufacturer’s good have
heterogeneous preferences regarding these services. This is the case, for example, in
the apparel or consumer electronics industry, in which some customers value more try-
ing on a Marc O’Polo shirt or testing Sony headphones than generous return policies
and recommendations, whereas for others it is the reverse. Vertical differentiation with
the manufacturer offering the high-end product is more relevant for markets such as
fragrances or high-end clothes, where manufacturers’ stores often provide an aura of
luxury, which is particularly attractive to high-valuation consumers. By contrast, con-
sumers with a lower valuation are likely to prefer the retailer’s channel, where they
can find more variety. Vertical differentiation with the retailer offering the high-end
product can instead arise in markets in which the manufacturer is relatively small or
unknown. An example is the market for organic food, where retailers such as iHerb or
Wholefoods offer a large variety and have been established for years, whereas many
brands sold there specialize on a particular kind of product, and only low-valuation
customer make the effort of visiting the manufacturer’s website.
Retail competition. A and B compete in prices for consumers. For each firm, we con-
sider two types of pricing policies: uniform pricing (non-discrimination), in which the
firm charges the same price to all consumers, and personalized pricing, in which the
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firm can perfectly discriminate consumers according to their types. Firm i’s price is
denoted by pi under uniform pricing, and by pi (x) under personalized pricing. Com-
bining the pricing policies of the firms, there are in total four different pricing regimes:
two symmetric regimes (i.e., both firms charge a uniform price, and both firms charge
personalized prices), and two hybrid regimes (i.e., A charges a uniform price and B
personalized prices, and vice versa).
Wholesale contracting. We consider two-part tariffs of the form T (q) = F + wq, where
F denotes the fixed fee and w the uniform wholesale price paid by B to A, and q is
the quantity bought by B.18 We suppose that the two firms adopt the Nash bargaining
solution to negotiate about w and F , with bargaining power  for A and 1   for B.
Timing. As discussed in the Introduction, the pricing regime is driven by technology
and data considerations: personalized pricing may be available in some industries,
and not in others. In addition, the bilateral relationship on which we are focusing here
can be part of a broader portfolio of relationships, in which case the pricing policy may
be based on the overall portfolio, and not on the particular bilateral relationship. This
leads us to first treat the pricing regime as exogenous. However, in other instances, the
pricing policy may be tailored to the specific relationship. For this reason, we consider
in Section 5 an extended version of our set-up in which we allow firms to contract on
a wholesale tariff and on their retail pricing policies.
Regarding the interplay between upstream and downstream pricing decisions, we
follow the literature and assume that wholesale contracting precedes retail pricing.
This reflects the fact that wholesale negotiations are relatively less frequent than retail
price adjustments. This leads us to consider the following timing:
 Stage 1: A and B negotiate the wholesale contract.
 Stage 2: Active firms set their retail prices. Consumers then observe all retail
prices and decide whether or not to buy, and from which firm to buy. If active, B
then orders the quantity from A to satisfy its demand.
In the first stage, firms can share their joint profit through the fixed fee; hence,
they seek to maximize the industry profit. Dual distribution is thus optimal if the
resulting industry profit is larger than the one with mono distribution. For the sake of
exposition, we will then say that dual distribution is optimal.
In the second stage, for symmetric pricing regimes, firms simultaneously set their
prices. For asymmetric pricing regimes, we follow Thisse and Vives (1988), Liu and
Zhang (2006), and Choe et al. (2018) in assuming that the firm charging a uniform
18In Online Appendix E, we show that our main results also hold with a linear wholesale contract.
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price, say firm i, acts as a price leader: it sets pi before the competitor sets its person-
alized prices p i(x). This assumption ensures the existence of a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. As pointed out by Thisse and Vives (1988), it is natural for asymmetric
regimes, as i can announce and advertise its uniform price in advance, whereas this
may be too complex or costly for the competitor. In addition, as noted by Choe et al.
(2018) and Chen et al. (2018), the adjustment of a uniform price is a higher-level mana-
gerial decision, that is relatively slower in practice than the adjustment of personalized
prices.
Solution concept. Our solution concept is subgame perfection.19 In the case of price
discrimination, asymmetric Bertrand competition for each consumer x is known to
generate multiple equilibria. Following the literature, we focus on the equilibrium in
which the firm offering the lower value prices at cost.20
Remark: wholesale personalized pricing. We focus on the case in which personalized
pricing may be possible at the retail but not at the wholesale level. That is, the whole-
sale contract cannot be conditioned on consumers’ types. While this would allow the
firms to maximize the industry profit, it is usually infeasible. Manufacturers are often
unable to monitor which consumers their distributors are selling to; and even if they
could obtain that information, it would be difficult to verify it in a court of law.
3.2 Optimality of Dual Distribution
Dual distribution expands the product range, which enables the firms to bring more
value to consumers, but it creates competition from B, which may dissipate profits.
This concern can however be mitigated by raising the wholesale price paid by B. The
next proposition shows that this instrument is indeed particularly effective in the case
of horizontal differentiation, as well as in the case of vertical differentiation when firm
B offers the high-end product.
Proposition 1: In all pricing regimes, dual distribution is optimal in the case of horizontal
differentiation (i.e., sB < 0) and, in the case of vertical differentiation, with B offering the
high-end product (i.e., sB > sA).
Proof: See Online Appendix A.
In the case of horizontal differentiation, consumers x  x^ constitute A’s “core mar-
19Formally, subgame perfection applies from stage 2 onwards. In stage 1, Nash bargaining could be
also be achieved as the equilibrium of a non-cooperative random-proposer game in which each firm
gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer with a probability reflecting its bargaining power. To obtain a
deterministic outcome, it suffices to introduce a preliminary stage in which one firm (either one) makes
an offer, with the random-proposer game acting as default option.
20This is the unique Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (in particular, it is the Pareto-dominant equi-
librium from the firms’ standpoint) and is also the unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
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ket”, whereas consumers x  x^ constitute B’s core market. Firm can then avoid com-
petition by agreeing on, say, w = u^: B cannot profitably sell inA’s core market, as these
consumers have a willingness-to-pay for B’s product which is below u^. Conversely, as
w constitutes A’s opportunity cost when competing against B,21 A has no incentive to
serve B’s core market. However, B sells to consumers in its core market at a higher
price thanA can dowith mono distribution. As a consequence, the industry profit with
dual distribution is higher than with mono distribution.
In particular, if both firms can charge personalized prices, setting w = u^ enables
them to extract the entire consumer surplus: A sells to consumers x  x^ at personal-
ized prices uA(x) and B sells to x  x^ at personalized prices uB(x). The equilibrium
industry profit is thus higher whenever both firms charge personalized prices than in
any other pricing regime. This result is in sharp contrast to the one obtained in the
classic papers on personalized pricing (e.g., Thisse and Vives, 1988, and Shaffer and
Zhang, 1995), which consider inter-brand competition between independent firms.
The possibility of personalized pricing then leads to a prisoner’s dilemma in which
firms choose personalized pricing but the industry profit is lower than with uniform
pricing. Our analysis shows that in the case of intra-brand competition between dis-
tribution channels, the result reverses, and a well-designed wholesale contract allows
firms to even extract the entire consumer surplus.
Consider now the case of vertical differentiation in which B’s core market includes
the high-valuation consumers. IfA charges a uniform price in the retail market, negoti-
ating a wholesale price equal toA’s monopoly price under mono distribution raisesA’s
profit: A’s margin when B serves a customer under dual distribution is then the same
as that under mono distribution, and A’s can still charge the same price as before to
the other customers. As B can charge a higher price to high-valuation consumers, the
industry profit increases compared to mono distribution. The argument carries over
when A charges personalized prices in the retail market: setting the wholesale price
to the highest of A’s monopoly prices, that is, w = rA, strictly increases the industry
profit. (In this case, A is strictly better off if B makes a sale.)
4 Vertical differentiation with A offering the high-end
product
Having shown that dual distribution is optimal with horizontal differentiation and
when B offers the high-end product, from now on we turn to the remaining scenario
21A receives a margin of w whenever B sells to a consumer; w thus represents A’s opportunity cost of
serving the customer itself.
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in which A offers the high-end product (i.e., sA > sB > 0). As already noted, the
assumptions x^ > 0 and u^ > 0 then imply rA > rB > 0 and:
  rB
rA
>
sB
sA
 :
To simplify the exposition, we restrict attention to the case in which no firm can
serve all consumers. That is, letting:
xi  ri
si
;
denote firm i’s marginal demand, we focus on the case (xA <)xB  X . None of our
qualitative results hinges on this assumption, but it helps to convey our insights in a
concise way.
4.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We proceed by first stating our main results of this section, which show that the op-
timality of dual distribution crucially depends on whether A can charge personalized
prices or not. We then sketch the arguments behind the results for each of the four
pricing regimes:
Proposition 2: In the case of vertical differentiation, when A offers the high-end product
(i.e., sA > sB > 0):
(i) If A charges a uniform price, then dual distribution is optimal, regardless of B’s pricing
regime.
(ii) If A charges personalized prices, then mono distribution is optimal if and only if:
 < 
2 + ()
p
1  
1 + 
; (2)
where () = 1 if B charges personalized prices as well and () =
q
2+5+2
1+2
> 1 if B
charges a uniform price.
Proof: See Online Appendix B.
We now sketch the arguments underlying Proposition 2.
Part (i)
We start with the situation in which both firms charge a uniform price. If only A is
active, it faces the monopoly demand (rA   pA) =sA; it thus charges the monopoly price
pmA = rA=2, serves consumers x  xmA = rA= (2sA), and obtains a profit of (the subscript
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U stands for Uniform pricing):
mU =
r2A
4sA
:
If instead A and B are both active, they charge retail prices pA and pB such that
some consumers favor A whereas others favor B. Let xAB > 0 denote the consumer
indifferent between buying from A or B, and xB > 0 denote the consumer indifferent
between buying from B and not buying:
xAB(pA; pB) =
rA   pA   rB + pB
sA   sB and xB(pB) =
rB   pB
sB
:
Any consumer x < xAB prefers A to B; hence, the demands for A and B are, respect-
ively, xAB and xB xAB. The profit functions of the two firms (gross of the fixed fee) are
thenA = xAB(pA; pB)pA+[xB(pB)  xAB(pA; pB)]w andB = [xB(pB)  xAB(pA; pB)] (pB 
w).
In the first stage, A and B negotiate over w and F , following the Nash bargaining
solution, taking into account that, in the second stage, each firm sets its retail price so as
to maximize its own profit. This implies that the firms set w to maximize the industry
profit and use F to share it according to their bargaining powers and outside options.22
Denoting the equilibrium prices at the retail stage by pi(w), the maximization problem
with respect to w is:
max
w
xAB(pA(w); pB(w))pA(w) + [xB(pB(w))  xAB(pA(w); pB(w))] pB(w)
Dual distribution is optimal if the resulting industry profit is larger than A’s profit
from mono distribution, mU . As shown in Proposition 2, this is indeed always the case
under uniform pricing.
We illustrate the intuition by Figure 2. To see that dual distribution leads to a
higher industry profit than mono distribution, note first that the firms can replicate the
outcome of mono distribution by negotiating a wholesale price wm = uB (xmA ). This
induces A to charge the monopoly price pmA and preventsB, which must charge at least
wm, from profitably attracting any consumer. Indeed, consumers with x > xmA are not
willing to pay wm, and those with x < xmA prefer A’s product at price p
m
A = uA(x
m
A )
to B’s product at any price pB  wm = uB(xmA ). Consider now a small reduction in
the wholesale price, w < wm, that generates a retail equilibrium in which B serves
some consumers at price pB = wm   dp. In this retail equilibrium, B cannot obtain
a negative profit and A cannot obtain less than what it would earn by charging p^A =
pmA   dp, so as to maintain its market share, xA = xmA . Doing so would lead B to sell a
22Specifically, A’s outside option is its profit from mono distribution whereas B’s outside option is
zero.
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quantity dxB implicitly given by dp   u0B (xmA ) dxB. Hence, the industry profit cannot
be lower than A + B  [(pmA   dp)xmA + wdxB] + 0 ' mU + uB(xmA )dxB   xmAdp =
mU +
d
dx
[uB (x)x]

x=xmA
dxB, which exceeds mU : as B faces a more elastic monopolistic
demand (that is, ju0B (x)j =uB (x) < ju0A (x)j =uA (x)),23 its monopolistic output exceeds
xmA (that is,
d
dx
[uB (x)x]

x=xmA
> 0).
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Figure 2: Uniform pricing
This shows that the industry profit is always larger if B is marginally active. This
insight does not hinge on the demand being linear; it holds more generally as long
as B’s monopolistic output exceeds that of A.24 Note however that the equilibrium
wholesale price may be substantially lower than wm, so that B’s market share may
also be substantial.
We now consider the scenario in which A still charges a uniform price but B can
offer personalized prices. The intuition why dual distribution is optimal in this case
is illustrated by Figure 3, which depicts the equilibrium prices under uniform pricing,
pA and p

B, and the retail prices of B that would emerge if the two firms opted for dual
distribution and set w = pB and pA = p

A (i.e., the equilibrium prices under uniform
pricing).25
23This is due the fact that  > .
24We provide a proof of this statement in Online Appendix I.
25Remember that A acts as a price leader in this regime: w and pA are chosen before B sets its retail
prices.
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A then serves consumers x < xA (for whom uA(x)  uB(x) = w), whereas B serves
consumers between xA and x

B (for whom uB(x) = w), and charges them prices equal
to min fpA + uB(x)  uA(x); uB(x)g. The resulting industry profit is larger than under
uniform pricing: in the segment served byA, the profit is the same because pA = pA; by
contrast, in the segment served byB, B charges a strictly higher price than pB. Because
opting for dual distribution was already optimal with uniform pricing, and yields even
more profits in the regime with personalized pricing by B, it also dominates mono
distribution in the latter regime.
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Figure 3: Profit with personalized pricing by B only if w = pB
Part (ii)
We now turn to the scenarios in whichA charges personalized prices. We start with the
symmetric regime, in which B charges personalized prices as well. If B is not active,
then A charges each consumer x a price equal to her utility uA (x), and thus obtains a
profit of (the subscript P stands for Personalized pricing):
mP =
Z xA
0
(rA   sAx) dx = r
2
A
2sA
: (3)
We now turn to equilibria in which A and B are both active, starting with the retail
stage.
Retail competition. As firms now compete for each consumer x, three cases can arise.
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If uB (x) < w, then B cannot offer a positive value to consumers without incurring
a loss; A then charges the monopoly price pA = uA (x).
If instead uA (x) < w  uB (x),Awould have to price below w to win the consumer,
and is therefore better off letting B serve this consumer; hence, B wins the competition
by charging the monopoly price uB (x) (and A charges a price equal to its opportunity
cost w, or any other price exceeding uA (x)).
The most interesting case occurs when w  uA (x) ; uB (x). As w constitutes A’s
opportunity cost from serving the consumer, andw isB’s real cost, a standard Bertrand
argument applies: for consumers x with ui(x) > uj(x), for i 6= j 2 fA;Bg, firm i wins
the competition and sells to the consumer at price pi(x) = w + ui(x)   uj(x), whereas
the other firm sets pj(x) = w.26
Wholesale negotiation. We now turn to the determination of the wholesale contract. We
first note that for any wholesale price w above u^, B is inactive in equilibrium: it is
dominated by A in the consumer segment x < x^, and cannot offer a positive value at a
profitable price in the segment x > x^. The profit thus cannot exceed mP .
If the firms negotiate a wholesale price w  u^, they are both active in the continu-
ation equilibrium. Let:
~xi (w)  ri   w
si
; (4)
denote the marginal consumer willing to buy product i at price w. The profits of the
two firms at the retail stage can be expressed as A and B, where:27
A =
Z x^
0
[w + uA(x)  uB(x)] dx+ w [~xB(w)  x^] ;
and:
B =
Z ~xA(w)
x^
[uB(x)  uA(x)] dx+
Z ~xB(w)
~xA(w)
[uB(x)  w] dx:
These profit functions are illustrated by Figure 4, where the hatched area repres-
ents the industry profit. The first term in A’s profit comes from consumers x < x^
(first region in Figure 4): A offers them a higher value, and serves them at price
w + uA(x)   uB(x). The second term in A’s profit reflects the wholesale revenue gen-
erated by consumers served by B (the other two rectangles in the figure). B’s profit
comes from consumers for whom it offers a higher value, and can also be split in two
parts. The first term corresponds to consumers x^ < x < ~xA(w) (second triangle), for
whom both firms compete, and so B only earns a margin uB(x)   uA(x). The second
26Both firms set a price of w to consumer x^.
27As we show in Online Appendix B, conditional on reaching an agreement (i.e., w < u^), the firms
negotiate awholesale price so thatB expands potential demand; that is,B sells to consumerswhowould
not be interested in buying from A at any positive price (i.e., w is sufficiently low that ~xB (w) > xA).
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term corresponds to consumers ~xA(w) < x < ~xB(w) (third triangle), to whom A offers
a lower value than w, and so B can extract the full value and earn a margin uB(x) w.
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Figure 4: Industry profit under personalized pricing
In the negotiation in the first stage, the firms maximize the industry profit:
(w) =
Z ~xA(w)
0
[w + juB(x)  uA(x)j] dx+
Z ~xB(w)
~xA(w)
uB(x)dx:
Taking the derivative with respect to w (and using ui(~xi(w)) = w for i = A;B) yields:
0(w) = ~xA(w) + w~x0B(w):
When negotiating on the wholesale price w, firms face the following trade-off. By
increasing w, the firms obtain a higher benefit from the inframarginal consumers in
the range x < ~xA(w): as the two firms compete for these consumers, an increase in w
increases the final consumer price by the same amount. However, increasing w has
also a negative effect on the marginal consumer, ~xB(w), for whom B can charge the
full value, uB (~xB(w)) = w. By contrast, the revenue from consumers between ~xA(w)
and ~xB(w) is unchanged, as these consumers continue buying from B and pay their
reservation price.
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Using (4), the first-order condition ~xA(w) + w~x0B(w) = 0 yields:
28
w =
sBrA
sA + sB
:
The associated industry profit is (recalling the notation   rB=rA 2 (0; 1) and  
sB=sA 2 (0; )):
P =
r2A
2sA
 (1 + 3)  4 (1 + ) + (1 + )2 2
 (1  2) ;
which is smaller than the monopoly profitmP given by (3) if and only if (2) holds, with
() = 1.
In contrast to the case with uniform pricing by A, when price discrimination at
the retail stage is possible, mono distribution may indeed occur. This happens if  is
sufficiently small.29 This result holds despite the fact that, with personalized pricing,
the two firms share the market efficiently: consumers x < x^ (resp., x > x^) buy from
A (resp., B). This was not true under uniform pricing, as B then sets a lower price
and therefore also sells to consumers who have a relative preference for A’s product.
However, personalized pricing also allows a firm to lower the price charged to mar-
ginal consumers down to marginal cost without sacrificing profit on inframarginal
consumers. This has two implications: first, B can serve additional consumers, and
thereby expand the market, and second, B prices more aggressively in A’s core mar-
ket. This in turn makes A more aggressive. Competition is thus more intense, which
dissipates profits; whenever this effect prevails, the firms do not reach an agreement,
resulting in mono distribution. Instead, under uniform pricing, firms tend to focus on
exploiting their market power over consumers in their respective core markets, which
leads to relatively high prices, and dual distribution.
The equilibrium configurations under personalized-pricing are depicted in Figure
5, in which the abbreviation (PP ) refers to the regime of personalized pricing by both
firms. Note first that under uniform pricing, dual distribution is optimal in the whole
range  >  (i.e., the range in which B adds value to the industry).30 By contrast, the
optimal distribution choice under personalized pricing depends on the specific values
of  and . The condition stated in Proposition 2 (ii) shows that mono distribution
is more likely to be optimal, the lower the net additional value being brought by B,
namely, the lower the relative intercept of B’s demand function (as measured by )
28The profit function is concave as 00(w) =   (1=sA + 1=sB) < 0.
29In Online Appendix F, we show that a qualitatively similar result emerges if firms can negotiate A’s
retail prices in the wholesale contract, in addition to specifying w and F .
30The figure also depicts the range 0   < , in which B does not add value, and, hence, mono
distribution is always optimal.
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and the steeper the relative slope (as measured by ). In fact, for () = 1, condition
(2) always holds if   (p5  1)=2  0:618, as the right-hand side is then larger than 1.
For  < (
p
5  1)=2, the right-hand side is strictly increasing in .
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Figure 5: Equilibrium configurations in the regimes (PP ) and (PU)
Finally, we turn to the situation in which only A can charge personalized prices
(regime (PU) in Figure 5). As stated in Proposition 2, mono distribution is again op-
timal if  is sufficiently small. The intuition is similar to the case with personalized
pricing by both firms—i.e., dual distribution leads to competition and destroys profit
from the high-valuation consumers to a sufficiently large extent that the industry profit
is higher with mono distribution. However, as () then exceeds 1, mono distribution
is optimal for a larger range in the hybrid regime. In particular, as illustrated in Figure
5, mono distribution is then always optimal if   0:473. This result emerges despite
the fact that competition is less intense in the hybrid regime due to the fact that B can
only charge a uniform price. The intuition behind the result is as follows: with sym-
metric personalized pricing, the firms can benefit from B’s ability to extract consumer
rent, particularly so if  is relatively small. By contrast, if B cannot charge personal-
ized prices, this ability is reduced. In addition, B always demands a mark-up on the
wholesale price, which implies that B serves fewer low-valuation consumers even if
wholesale prices in both regimes were the same. Hence, the industry profit with dual
distribution is lower in the hybrid regime, which leads to a larger range in which mono
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distribution is optimal.
We conclude this section by noting that wholesale prices can be ranked across pri-
cing regimes:31
wUU < w

UP < w

PP < w

PU ;
where the subscripts refer to A’s and B’s pricing policies. This shows that wholesale
prices are higher when A can charge personalized prices as compared to a uniform
one.
4.2 Discussion
We now discuss several lessons from our analysis. A first insight is that the impact
of personalized pricing on competition and profits may affect channel decisions: dual
distribution, which is always optimal under uniform pricing, need not be so anymore
under personalized pricing. However, the way in which the pricing regime affects the
channel decision departs from common wisdom. For example, in the case of horizontal
differentiation, personalized pricing intensifies inter-brand competition and dissipates
profits (see e.g., Thisse and Vives (1988) and Shaffer and Zhang (1995)), suggesting that
dual distribution is less attractive. But in the case of intra-brand competition considered
here, firms can use the wholesale contract to alleviate competition,32 and can actually
maximize total industry profit; as a result, dual distribution is always optimal.
In the case of vertical differentiation, the impact of personalized pricing on inter-
brand competition is less clear-cut. As we show in the Appendix, the profit of one
firm (either one) or even both firms may actually increase. Yet, this provides little
guidance on the impact of personalized pricing on the channel decision. If the manu-
facturer offers the low-end product, then, as shown by Proposition 1, dual distribution
is always optimal, regardless of the pricing regime’s impact on inter-brand competi-
tion and profits. By contrast, if the manufacturer offers the high-end product then, as
shown by Proposition 2, mono distribution can be optimal, regardless of how person-
alized pricing would affect inter-brand competition and profits. In particular, mono
distribution can be optimal even if personalized pricing would increase both firms’
profits in the case of inter-brand competition—the reason is that it would increase even
more the profit from mono distribution.
A second insight concerns firms’ market shares in the case of vertical differenti-
ation with A offering the high-end product. Under uniform pricing, dual distribution
is always optimal. However, B’s market share is small if, for example,  is close to 0
31We show this result in Online Appendix G.
32The case of inter-brand competition can be interpreted as imposing to charge a wholesale price w
equal to marginal cost.
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or  close to 1. By contrast, under personalized pricing, dual distribution is not op-
timal when B would have a small market share. The reason is that B would then
add little value to the industry but still compete for high-valuation consumers. As a
consequence, A opts for dual distribution only when the independent retailer serves a
sufficiently large share of the market. Table 1 illustrates this with a numerical example.
We set  = 0:4 and then report B’s market shares for different values of  under uni-
form pricing by both firms and personalized pricing by both firms. Notice that B’s
market share is higher with personalized pricing than with uniform pricing whenever
 is sufficiently high, so that dual distribution occurs under personalized pricing.33
 Uniform Pricing Personalized Pricing
0.5 0.27 0
0.6 0.45 0
0.7 0.59 0
0.8 0.69 0.74
0.9 0.77 0.89
Table 1: Market shares of firm B in the different regimes
Finally, our results are in line with the distribution structures observed in differ-
ent industries. Specifically, our model predicts that the mode of differentiation—i.e.,
horizontal versus vertical—and whether the manufacturers or the retailer offers the
high-end product are key determinants of the optimal distribution system. In case of
vertical differentiation, when the manufacturer offers the high-end product, mono dis-
tribution may occur. This matches well with the distribution systems in markets for
luxury products, such as perfume, high-end apparel, or jewelry, in which brand man-
ufacturers usually eschew independent retailers and prefer to distribute only through
the direct channel. For example, several recent antitrust cases center around the theme
that high-end brand suppliers—e.g., the perfume seller Coty or the sport shoe manu-
facturer Asics—forbid sales through through third-party websites or other independ-
ent distributors. Our model provides an explanation for this result, and predicts that
this problem gets more severe if price discrimination becomes more finely tuned. In-
stead, for more mainstream products, such as low-end clothes, electronic equipment,
or certain kinds of food, manufacturers usually seek to distribute through independ-
ent retailers; hence, these products are available through multiple channels. For these
products, consumers view manufacturers and retailers usually as horizontally differ-
entiated or high-valuation consumers prefer the retailer for relatively small brands.
Consistent with the observed channel structures, our model predicts that dual distri-
bution is optimal in these cases.
33A similar comparison can be made when considering the hybrid regimes.
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5 Endogenous Pricing Regime
In this section, we extend our model by considering the situation in which both pricing
policies (i.e., personalized pricing and uniform pricing) are available to both firms, and
firms endogenously decide on the pricing regime in their negotiation.
When being able to negotiate the pricing regime, the contract at the wholesale stage
consists of four elements: the per-unit price w, the fixed fee F , A’s pricing policy, and
B’s pricing policy. The firms choose these variables to maximize the industry profit,
conditional on retail prices being chosen individually by each firm later. Throughout
the section, we are particularly interested in the question whether or not firms benefit
from not using personalized pricing.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium pricing regimes that occur for
different parameter constellations:
Proposition 3: If firms can contract on their pricing policies, then:
(i) dual distribution together with personalized pricing by both firms is optimal if and only if:

2 +
p
1  
1 + 
   1 + 4
3 + 2
; (5)
(ii) dual distribution together with uniform pricing by A and personalized pricing by B is
optimal if and only if:
  max
(
1 + 4
3 + 2
;  +
r
 (1  2)
2 + 
)
;
(iii) for all other parameter combinations, mono distribution is optimal.
Proof: See Online Appendix C.
Figure 6 illustrates these insights.34 If distributing via B does not expand demand
significantly ( large and/or  small), then mono distribution maximizes the industry
profit, as it avoids downstream competition and allows to better exploit price discrim-
ination. When instead the independent retailer brings enough value, the firms opt
for dual distribution. In this case, the firms may benefit from restricting A to a uni-
form price, but prefer B to charge personalized prices. Specifically, restricting A’s pri-
cing policy is optimal when B is a relatively strong competitor for high-valuation con-
sumers (i.e.,  high enough); this is represented by the lower-right area in the figure. To
see why this may occur, note that restricting A’s pricing policy leads it to focus on its
core market, which dampens the competitive pressure onB, allowing it to extract more
34As the figure shows, the three thresholds of the proposition coincide at  = ~  0:248, where ~ is
the unique solution to the equation
p
1   = (3 + 2) in the range (0; (p5   1)=2). Dual distribution
together with personalized pricing by both firms can only be optimal if   ~, as otherwise (5) cannot
hold. Similarly, dual distribution together with uniform pricing by A and personalized pricing byB can
only be optimal if  <
 p
5  1 =2, as otherwise  +p( (1  2)) = (2 + )would be larger than 1.
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surplus from medium-range consumers—i.e., those consumers at the margin between
buying from A or from B. This however comes at a cost, as A’s ability to extract rents
from the high-valuation consumers is impeded. Therefore, if B is only a weak compet-
itor for high-valuation consumers but expands demand significantly (i.e.,  and  are
relatively small), personalized pricing by both firms is optimal.
-
6


1
1
0:618
Dual Distribution
A: Unif. Pricing
B: Pers. Pricing
-
Dual Distribution
A: Pers. Pricing
B: Pers. Pricing
Mono
Distribution
Pers. Pricing

Mono Distribution

Pers. Pricing

Figure 6: Endogenous pricing regime
6 Distribution by the retailer only
We assumed so far that A always uses its direct channel. In this section, we extend
our model by allowing firms to opt for mono distribution by B. By the same logic as
before, the firms will find this optimal when doing so maximizes the industry profit.
Letting RBXY denote the range of values of  and  for which mono distribution by B
is optimal in the pricing regimeXY , the next proposition shows that the ranges can be
clearly ordered:
Proposition 4: In each of the four pricing regimes, there exist values of  and  for which
mono distribution by B is optimal. The range of these parameters can be ordered as follows:
RBPU  RBUU  RBPP  RBUP :
Proof: See Online Appendix D.
24
In contrast to mono distribution by A, which can only be optimal if A charges
personalized prices, mono distribution byB can be optimal in each pricing regime. The
intuition is as follows: in all four pricing regimes, mono distribution by B is optimal if
 is relatively small, which implies that B increases demand substantially. Therefore,
via using only B’s channel, firms avoid competition, which allows B to profit most
from its large demand. By contrast, A’s relative advantage is not to broaden demand
but to deliver a higher utility to high-valuation consumers. If A can only set a uniform
price, its rent extraction possibility is limited, and mono distribution by A is never
optimal.
In addition, the ranges in which mono distribution by B is optimal in the different
pricing regimes has a clear order. This range is larger if B charges personalized prices
rather than a uniform price, and, given B’s pricing policy, the range is larger if A can
only set a uniform price. This is obvious when comparing mono distribution by A
with mono distribution by B, as the profit achieved by a firm under mono distribution
is maximal when it can extract the entire surplus through personalized pricing. The
proposition shows that the insight carries over when considering dual distribution as
well.
Finally, we consider the extent of mono distribution by either firm in the different
pricing regimes. The resulting ranking is not clear-cut; for example, there exists a range
of parameter values in which mono distribution by one of the two firms is optimal in
the regime PP but not in the regime UP and another range in which the opposite
holds. However, both firms switching from uniform to personalized pricing strictly
expands the scope for mono distribution (by one or the other firm): lettingRA=BXY denote
the parameter range in which mono distribution is optimal, we have:35
RA=BUU  RA=BPP :
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of personalized pricing on the incentives of a brand
manufacturer to opt for dual distribution. Adding an independent distribution chan-
nel enables the manufacturer to reach out to different consumer groups but triggers
intra-brand competition with its own distribution channel. We show that the profit-
ability of dual distribution crucially depends on the demand pattern. If the two chan-
nels are horizontally differentiated, or if the independent retailer offers the high-end
product, then dual distribution is optimal regardless of whether firms can set personal-
ized prices or only a uniform one. By contrast, if the manufacturer offers the high-end
35The details of the computation can be found in Online Appendix H.
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product, this result only holds if the manufacturer charges a uniform price to con-
sumers. If instead the manufacturer can offer personalized prices, then the two chan-
nels compete more intensely for each type of consumer; this dissipates profits to such
an extent that the manufacturer opts for dual distribution only when the independent
retailer expands demand significantly. These insights differ substantially from those
obtained for inter-brand competition between independent firms, but are in line with
the channel structures observed in different industries. This shows that accounting for
the possibility of influencing intra-brand competition through the wholesale contract
is important for assessing the effects of personalized pricing.
We also find that a hybrid regime—in which only the retailer can offer personal-
ized prices—may lead to the highest industry profit. The manufacturer then extracts
less surplus from high-valuation consumers, but benefits from reduced intra-brand
competition. This implies that the manufacturer may optimally forgo charging per-
sonalized prices even if it has the possibility of doing so.
Our most important implication for marketingmanagers is that the extent to which
price discrimination is feasible not only affects the pricing strategy but also the optimal
distribution network. With prices becoming more and more finely tuned to consumer
tastes, brand manufacturers risk fierce competition with pure retailers, even if these
retailers may appeal to different consumer groups. In case a manufacturer caters fore-
most to the high-end segment, this channel conflict calls for a cautious use of new
distribution channels when price discrimination is possible at a finely-grained level.
This holds particularly for products sold online, for which consumer data and pur-
chase history is available. It can then be more profitable to rely on mono distribution
by the manufacturer or by the retailer, in order to avoid intra-brand competition. By
contrast, dual distribution is beneficial if price discrimination is hard to achieve.
Another implication is that adopting a non-discriminatory pricing policy can be a
profitable strategy for manufacturers. This is particularly true for companies facing
the opportunity of distributing their products through a data-intensive retailer, which
can perform price discrimination and broaden demand substantially. In that case, not
using consumer data for its own distribution channel can achieve the right balance
between rent extraction (by the retailer) and the avoidance of fierce intra-brand com-
petition.
We conclude by briefly discussing two interesting avenues for future research emer-
ging from our model. First, we considered a situation in which a firm can set person-
alized prices to all of its consumers, given that personalized pricing is possible. How-
ever, firms may have access to data only from consumers who have previously bought
from the firm. A dynamic extension of our model in which firms set a uniform price
in early periods but can charge personalized prices to its previous customers in later
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periods can shed light on how price setting to learn about consumer preferences shapes
channel design. Second, our model assumes that the brandmanufacturer does not face
competition from rival manufacturers. This is a reasonable assumption in markets in
which brands are strongly differentiated and helps singling out the effects at work in
a clear way. Analyzing whether new effects emerge with competition between man-
ufacturers, and the resulting implications for wholesale contracts in such an extended
scenario, constitutes a fruitful direction for future research.
Appendix
Inter-brand versus intra-brand competition
This appendix emphasizes that the classic insights from the literature on inter-brand
competition provide little guidance for the choice of the distribution channels. In the
case of horizontal differentiation à la Hotelling, personalized pricing dissipates profits
under inter-brand competition, and maximizes instead the industry profit achieved
under intra-brand competition (i.e, dual distribution). In the case of vertical differenti-
ation, the following proposition shows that personalized pricing can actually increase
industry profit:
Proposition 5: Suppose sB > 0 (vertical differentiation). Under inter-brand competition:
 if     2  3  2p2  0:343, personalized pricing increases industry profit;
 if instead     5 p17  0:877, personalized pricing decreases industry profit;
 finally, if  <  < , there exist () >  and () 2 ((); 1) such that personalized
pricing increases industry profit if and only if  < () or  > ().
Proof. The case of inter-brand competition between independent firms is equi-
valent to that of intra-brand competition in which the wholesale price w equals zero.
Using the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2, the profits of the two firms are
given by:
AU(w = 0) =
r2A
sA
(2    )2
(4  )2(1  ) and 
B
U (w = 0) =
r2A
sA
(2  (1 + ))2
(4  )2(1  )
for uniform pricing, and by:
AP (w = 0) =
r2A
sA
(1  )2
2(1  ) and 
B
P (w = 0) =
r2A
sA
(  )2
2(1  )
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for personalized pricing. It follows that A benefits from personalized pricing if and
only if:
  A() 
 p
2  1  2p2  
4 p2   ;
whereas B benefits from personalized pricing if and only if:
  B() 

 p
2 + 1
  
4 p2  
2
p
2 + 
;
where A() > B() when  < , in which case both firms benefit from personalized
pricing. Turning to the joint profits, the difference between the industry profit with
personalized and uniform pricing is given by:
r2A
2sA
(8 + 14   92 + 3) (2 + )  4 (12  6 + 2)
(1  )(4  )2 : (6)
The numerator is a convex quadratic polynomial of with the two roots:
()  2 (12  6 + 
2)  (1  )(4  )p(12   4  2)
8 + 14   92 + 3
and
()  2 (12  6 + 
2) + (1  )(4  )p(12   4  2)
8 + 14   92 + 3 ;
whereas the denominator is positive. It is straightforward to check that for  < ,
the numerator of (6) is always positive, implying that personalized prices increases
industry profit. If instead   , personalized pricing increases industry profit if  
() or   (). The threshold () is increasing in  and reaches 1 at  = . Similarly,
() is decreasing in  and reaches the lower bound for , which is , also at  = .
It follows that for  > , personalized pricing decreases industry profit in the entire
admissible range for .
This proposition shows that personalized has a different impact on inter-brand
competition in situations of vertical and horizontal differentiation. In the context of
a Hotelling model, Thisse and Vives (1988) and Shaffer and Zhang (1995) show that
personalized pricing unambiguously lowers industry profit. The proposition shows
instead that, with vertical differentiation, this is not necessarily true: there is indeed a
sizable range in which the opposite obtains.
The impact of personalized pricing on inter-brand competition moreover provides
little guidance for the question whether or not dual distribution is optimal in case of
intra-brand competition. First, as shown by Proposition 1, if the manufacturer offers
the low-end product, then dual distribution is always optimal in case of intra-brand
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competition, regardless of the pricing regime. Therefore, the optimal distribution re-
gime in this case does not depend on whether personalized pricing increases or de-
creases profits under inter-brand competition. Second, as shown by Proposition 2, if
the manufacturer offers the high-end product, thenmono distribution is optimal under
intra-brand competition if  is close to —i.e., if  < ~()    2 +p1   =(1+). By
contrast, as shown by Proposition 5, with inter-brand competition and     0:877,
personalized pricing increases the industry profit whenever  is close to . Mono dis-
tribution can actually be optimal even if personalized pricing increases the profits of
both firms in the case of inter-brand competition. Indeed, it is straightforward to check
that ~() > B() for  2 (0; 1) and ~() < A() for  / 0:230; hence, this situation
occurs for  2 (0; 0:230) if B()    ~().
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Online Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
A.1: Horizontal differentiation
A.1.1: Uniform pricing by A
Let pmA define firm A’s optimal (uniform) price under mono distribution, and 
m
A the
associated profit. To show that dual distribution is optimal, it suffices to show that
an appropriate two-part tariff leads to a continuation equilibrium in which both firms
earn greater profit (and one firm does strictly so) than under mono distribution. To see
this, suppose that the firms agreed instead on the wholesale tariff F = 0 and w = u^.
Assume first that B also charges a uniform price. In the continuation equilibrium,
B then charges a price pB > w = u^, such that it obtains a positive share the market:
as consumers close to X have a higher valuation for B’s product than for A’s product,
there exists an x^B 2 (x^; X) such that consumers x > x^B buy from B in the continuation
equilibrium. Suppose now that A charges the mono-distribution price pmA . If p
m
A 
u^, then B still attracts all consumers x > x^B; hence, firm A’s profit becomes mA +
u^ (X   x^B) > mA . If instead pmA < u^, then B still attracts those consumers that are close
enough toX ;36 hence, compared tomono distribution, total sales can only increase, and
A earns a greater margin (u^ > pmA ) on the consumers served by B. We thus have that,
by charging pmA , A obtains a greater profit than 
m
A . It follows that, in the continuation
equilibrium (where it best responds to pB), A a fortiori obtains a profit higher than
mA . In other words, the tariff F = 0 and w = u^ yields a continuation equilibrium that
strictly increases each firm’s profit.
The same reasoning applies to the case in which B charges personalized prices. In
the continuation equilibrium, B attracts some consumers, and by charging pmA in the
retail stage, A obtains a higher profit than mA , either by expanding the market served
or by earning a higher margin on existing customers.
A.1.2: Personalized pricing by A
Under mono distribution, firm A charges each consumer a price uA (x). Suppose now
that the firms agree on the two-part tariff F = 0 and w = u^.
If both firms charge personalized prices, A still charges uA (x) to consumers x < x^
36In the case of mono distribution, either A covers part of the market, or it covers all the market but
leaves no net utility to the marginal consumer x = X . In both cases, B attracts consumers close enough
to X with the price pB .
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(as B cannot offer them any positive value at any price pB (x)  w = u^), and now
obtains w > uA (x) on consumers x > x^ (which are served by B at price pB (x) =
uB (x)).37
Consider now the case in which B charges a uniform price. In the continuation
equilibrium, A still charges pA (x) = uA (x) to consumers x < x^, for the same reason as
above. For consumers x^ < x  X , B charges the price pB that maximizes its monopoly
profit, given the wholesale price w = u^, and attracts some consumers x > x^B, where
x^B 2 (x^; X). To see this, note first that A charges pA (x) = uA (x) to all consumers
x, with uB(x) < pB, because these consumers obtain a negative utility when buying
from B, which implies that A can extract the entire consumer surplus. Instead, for
consumers who obtain a positive utility when buying from B, A can earn a higher
margin—i.e., u^ = uA (x^) > uA (x)—when B serves these consumers than when serving
these consumers itself. Therefore, in the continuation equilibrium, A charges these
consumers any price larger than or equal to uA(x), and B serves these consumers. It
follows that, again,A earns a highermargin on the consumers served byB, and obtains
a higher profit compared to mono distribution.
A.2: Vertical differentiation
We now turn to the case of vertical differentiation, with B being more attractive for
high-valuation consumers (i.e., sB > sA and rB > rA).
A.2.1: Uniform pricing by A
Suppose that the firms agreed on the wholesale tariff F = 0 and w = pmA .
Assume first that B also charges a uniform price. In the continuation equilibrium,
B then charges a price pB > w = pmA on all consumers served and obtains a positive
share the market,38 whereas A charges some price p+A.
39 Suppose now that A deviates
and charges the mono-distribution price pmA . Following this deviation, total demand
(weakly) exceeds that of the mono-distribution outcome (as consumers have more
choice) and A obtains a margin pmA (either directly through pA or indirectly through
37Recall that, as usual, we focus on the Pareto efficient equilibrium, in which A does not sell below its
opportunity cost (given here by w = u^).
38To see this, suppose instead that B does not attract any consumer. In that case, B prices at cost (i.e.,
pB = w = p
m
A ) and A prices so as to attract consumers with type x = 0 (i.e., pA  pmA   (rB   rA) < pmA ),
and obtains a profit lower than mA (as it charges pA 6= pmA , and B attracts no additional consumer). But
then, A would profitably deviate by charging p0A = p
m
A : compared with the mono distribution outcome,
this would (weakly) expand demand (as consumers can now buy from both firms) and A would obtain
the same margin on each customer (either directly through p0A, or indirectly through w); hence, the
deviation brings a profit of at least mA .
39Compared with mono distribution, B now charges a “lower” price (the mono distribution outcome
can be interpreted as B charging pB  rB), and in response A also lowers its own price.
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w). It follows that B’s profit is strictly positive after the deviation, and A’s profit is
weakly larger. Therefore, in the continuation equilibrium in which A best responds to
pB, the same result must hold. As a consequence, the tariff F = 0 and w = pmA yields
a continuation equilibrium that strictly increases B’s profit and weakly increases A’s
profit.
The same reasoning applies to the case in which B charges personalized prices. In
the continuation equilibrium, after firms agreed on a tariff F = 0 and w = pmA , B’s
demand is positive, and A charges some price p++A . A deviation to pA = p
m
A then gives
A a profit that is weakly larger than mA due to the fact that it obtains the same price p
m
A
on all consumers served and demand weakly exceeds that with mono distribution.
A.2.2: Personalized pricing by A
Under mono distribution, A charges each consumer a price uA (x). Suppose now that
the firms agree on the two-part tariff F = 0 and w = rA. In the continuation equi-
librium, B obtains a positive demand from consumers close enough to x = 0: these
consumers have a valuation for B’s product equal to uB(x), which is larger than B’s
wholesale price w = rA, and A earns a higher margin by letting B serve these con-
sumers, as w = rA > uA(x). Therefore, A charges prices larger than or equal to w to the
consumers served by B, and obtains a higher margin compared to mono distribution.
This holds regardless of whether B charges personalized prices or a uniform price. In
addition, B does not offer a positive net utility to consumers it does not serve: it it did,
B would serve these consumers because A is better off by letting B serve these con-
sumers and get a margin w > uA(x) instead of serving the consumers itself. It follows
that A can still charge a price of pA(x) = uA(x) to these consumers. Hence, A obtains
the same profit as under mono distribution from consumers that it serves but a strictly
larger profit from consumers served by B. Therefore, the two-part tariff F = 0 and
w = rA increases the profits of both firms.
Online Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
B.1: Uniform pricing by A
B.1.1: Uniform pricing by B
We start with part (i) and first analyze the situation of uniform pricing by both firms.
To solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium, we proceed by backward induction and
first determine the reaction functions in the downstream stage. To simplify the exposi-
tion, we proceed under the assumption that both demands are positive in equilibrium
and verify later that this is in fact true. The linearity of the demand functions ensures
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that firms’ profit functions are strictly concave in their prices; hence, firms’ reaction
functions are characterized by the first-order conditions, which yield:
pA(pB;w) =
rA   rB + pB + w
2
;
pB(pA;w) =
rB + w
2
+
sB (pA   rA)
2sA
:
Combining these reaction functions yields the equilibrium retail prices, as a function
of the wholesale price w:
pA (w) =
rA(2sA   sB) + sA(3w   rB)
4sA   sB ; (7)
pB (w) =
rB(2sA   sB) + w(2sA + sB)  rAsB
4sA   sB :
The associated demands areDA (w) = xAB (pA (w) ; pB (w)) andDB (w) = xB (pB (w)) 
xAB (pA (w) ; pB (w)).
We now turn to the first stage. In the negotiation stage, firms choose w so as to
maximize the industry profit, (w) = pA (w)DA (w) + pB (w)DB (w). This profit is
again a strictly concave function of w, as its second-order derivative is given by:
00 (w) =  2sA(4sA + 5sB)
sB(4sA   sB)2 < 0:
Hence, the equilibrium wholesale price is characterized by the first-order condition,
leading to:
wU =
sB(4sA(rA + rB) + rAsB)
2sA(4sA + 5sB)
:
Inserting the equilibrium prices into the demand functions DA and DB yields:
DA =
2s2A(2rA   rB) + sB(3sArA   4sArB   sBrA)
2sA(4sA + 5sB)(sA   sB) ;
DB =
(2sA + sB)(rBsA   rAsB)
sB(4sA + 5sB)(sA   sB) :
The assumption that the two demand functions intersect at a positive valuation (i.e.,
rA=sA < rB=sB) ensures that both equilibrium demands are positive. Indeed, DA is
strictly falling in rB and is equal to rA(2sA + sB)=(2sA(4sA + 5sB)) > 0 at the highest
possible value of rB, which is rB = rA. Direct inspection ofDB shows that it is positive
for rA=sA < rB=sB. As w constitutes a global maximum in the relevant range, and
achieving DB = 0 is feasible with a high enough w, it follows that in equilibrium it is
optimal for the firms to generate positive sales forB. Indeed, the resulting profit, equal
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to:
U =
r2AsB (5sAsB + 4s
2
A   s2B) + 4sArB (sA + sB) (sArB   2sBrA)
4sAsB (sA   sB) (4sA + 5sB) ; (8)
exceeds the monopoly profit that A can obtain with mono distribution, mU :
U   mU =
(sA + sB)(sArB   rAsB)2
sAsB(4sA + 5sB)(sA   sB) > 0:
B.1.2: Personalized pricing by B
We next analyze the case in which B can charge personalized prices (and A still a
uniform one). Givenw and pA,B’s price response is such that consumers xwith uA(x) 
pA > uB(x)  w, or:
x < x (w; pA) =
rA   pA   rB + w
sA   sB ;
end-up buying fromA. Instead, consumers x (w; pA) < x < ~xB (w) end-up buying from
B at price pB (x) = uB (x) max fuA (x)  pA; 0g. A’s variable profit (gross of the fee F )
is therefore given by:
pAx (w; pA) + w [~xB (w)  x (w; pA)] :
Optimizing this with respect to pA yields:
pA (w) = w +
rA   rB
2
:
We now turn to the wholesale stage. The two firms seek to maximize the industry
profit given by:
 = pA(w)x (w) +
Z x^(w)
x(w)
[pA(w) + uB (x)  uA (x)] dx+
Z ~xB(w)
x^(w)
uB (x) dx; (9)
where pA(w) = w+(rA rB)=2, x(w) = (rA   pA   rB + w) = (sA   sB), x^(w) = (rA + rB) =
(2sA) w=sA, and ~xB(w) = (rB w)=sB. Maximizing this profit with respect to w yields
(the subscript UP stands for the pricing regime in which A sets a Uniform price and B
Personalized prices):40
wUP =
sB(rA + rB)
2(sA + sB)
:
40It is straightforward to check that the industry profit is a concave function of w.
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Inserting w = wUP into (9), we obtain that the industry profit is given by:
UP =
r2AsAsB + 2r
2
As
2
B   4rArBsAsB   2rArBs2B + 2r2Bs2A + r2BsAsB
4s2AsB   4s3B
=
r2A
sA
 + 22   4   22 + 22 + 2
4 (1  2) :
We can now show that this profit exceeds the profit obtained under uniform pri-
cing, which, from (8), can be written as:
U =
r2A
sA
4 + 52   3   8   82 + 42 + 42
4 (1  ) (4 + 5) :
We have:
UP   U =
(   )2 r2A
4sA
4 + 6 + 2
(4 + 5) (1  2) > 0:
This establishes that the profit in the regime with uniform pricing by A and personal-
ized pricing by B is larger than under uniform pricing by both firms.
We know from above that dual distribution is optimal in case both firms set uni-
form prices. Because the industry profit in the regime in which only B can charge
personalized prices (i.e., UP ) is larger than 

U , it must also be larger than the profit
with mono distribution.
B.2: Personalized pricing by A
B.2.1: Personalized pricing by B
We now turn to part (ii), and start with the situation of personalized pricing by both
firms. As noted in the main text, if the wholesale price w is such that w  u^, B will
be inactive;41 hence, the industry profit cannot be larger than mP . Using the notation
  rB=rA 2 (0; 1) and   sB=sA 2 (0; ), the threshold u^ is:
u^  sArB   sBrA
sA   sB = rA
  
1   :
We now focus on w  u^. We need to distinguish whether or not B finds it prof-
itable to supply (some) consumers uninterested in A’s product. From Figure 3, such
consumers exist if and only if ~xB (w) > xA. The latter inequality can only hold if w is
sufficiently low, that is:
w < w  rB   sB
sA
rA = rA (  ) :
41Recall that u^ = uA (x^) = uB (x^).
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Note that w = (1  ) u^ < u^.
Region w  w
In this region, in which ~xB (w)  xA, as shown in the text, the industry profit is given
by:
(w) =
Z ~xA(w)
0
[w + juB(x)  uA(x)j] dx+
Z ~xB(w)
~xA(w)
uB(x)dx:
It is strictly concave in w: using uA (~xA (w)) = uB (~xB (w)) = w, we have:
0 (w) = ~xA (w) + w
d~xB
dw
(w) =
rA   w
sA
  w
sB
=
rA
sA

1  1 + 

w
rA

;
and thus (as ~xA (w) and ~xB (w) are both linear and strictly decreasing in w):
00 (w) =
d~xA
dw
(w) +
d~xB
dw
(w) < 0:
Region w < w  u^
If instead w > w, the industry profit includes an additional term, as illustrated by
Figure A.1. This term corresponds to consumers in the region ~xB(w) < x  xA: B
does not find it profitable to supply these consumers (as uB(x) < w), but they are still
willing to buy fromA, which can extract their full surplus. The industry profit can then
be written as:
(w) =
Z ~xA(w)
0
[w + juB(x)  uA(x)j] dx+
Z ~xB(w)
~xA(w)
uB(x)dx+
Z xA
~xB(w)
uA(x)dx:
The first-order derivative is equal to:
0(w) = ~xA(w) + [w   uA (~xB(w))] d~xB
dw
(w)
= (rA   w)

1
sA
+
1
sB

  (rB   w)sA
s2B
=
rA
sA
2 +    + (1     2) w
rA
2
:
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Figure A1: Profits if w > w
Hence:
0  (u^) =
rA
sA
1  
1   ;
0+ (w) =
rA
sA
1 + 



2 + 
1 + 
  

;
00 (w) =
1     2
sA2
:
It follows that (w) is strictly concave in w if:
 > ^ =
p
5  1
2
' 0:618;
and is instead weakly convex if   ^; in addition, 0 (u^) > 0whereas 0 (w)  0 if and
only if:
  ^ ()  2 + 
1 + 
;
where ^ () increases with  and exceeds 1 for   ^. Furthermore, not only is the
profit function (w) continuous at w = w, its derivative 0 (w) is also continuous:
0  (w) =
rA
sA

1  1 + 

w
sA

w=rA( )
=
rA
sA
1 + 



2 + 
1 + 
  

= 0+ (w) :
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Optimal distribution policy
As long as w  u^, B cannot attract any consumer at any profitable price: hence, do-
ing so cannot be more profitable than mono distribution. Furthermore, if   ^ (),
then 0 (w)  0, implying that dual distribution cannot be more profitable than mono
distribution:
 in the range w  w  u^, the profit function (w) is increasing, as it is quadratic
and its derivative is non-negative at both ends of the range (namely, 0 (w)  0
and 0 (u^) > 0);
 in the range w  w, the profit function (w) is again increasing, as it is concave
and its derivative is non-negative at the upper end of the range (namely, 0 (w) 
0);
 it follows that the profit achieved under dual distribution cannot exceed (u^),
which is less profitable than mono distribution.
As already noted, ^ () is increasing in  in the range  2 [0; 1], and satisfies ^ () 
1 for   ^. It follows that, if   ^, then dual distribution cannot be more profitable
than mono distribution, as we then have ^ ()  1 (> ).
If instead  < ^ and  > ^ (), then0 (w) < 0. From the analysis for the region w 
w above, the first-order condition 0 (w) = 0 then determines the candidate optimal
wholesale price, which is given by:
w = wP =
sBrA
sA + sB
 rA
1 + 
2 (0; w) :
The corresponding profit is:
P =
r2A
2sA
 (1 + 3)  4 (1 + ) + (1 + )2 2
 (1  2) :
Compared with the profit from mono distribution, mP , dual distribution introduces a
change in profit equal to:
r2A
2sA
2 ( + 3)  4 (1 + ) + (1 + )2 2
 (1  2) :
The numerator of this expression is a convex quadratic polynomial of  and its roots
are:

2 p1  
1 + 
and 
2 +
p
1  
1 + 
:
41
Furthermore, ^ () lies between these two roots in the relevant range  < ^:
 2 
p
1 
1+
^ ()
=
 2 
p
1 
1+
 2+
1+
=
2 p1  
2 + 
< 1;
 2+
p
1 
1+
^ ()
=
 2+
p
1 
1+
 2+
1+
=
2 +
p
1  
2 + 
> 1;
where the last inequality stems from
p
1   >  in the relevant range  < ^. It follows
that dual distribution is more profitable than mono distribution if and only if  < ^
and  exceeds the larger root, that is, if:
 > ~ ()  2 +
p
1  
1 + 
Note that ~ () is increasing in  in the range   ^, and exceeds 1 in the range   ^.
Hence, as  < 1, the condition  > ~ () implies  < ^. Finally, ~ () is equivalent to
the right-hand side of (2)with () = 1.
B.2.2: Uniform pricing by B
We now move to the hybrid regime in which A charges personalized prices and B a
uniform one. Again, we solve the game by backward induction. Consider first A’s
price response to a given w and pB. Two market share configurations can occur, de-
pendent on the value of pB. When pB is relatively small, the marginal consumer indif-
ferent between buying from B and not buying, xB = (rB   pB) =sB, exceeds xA. A’s
best response is to serve consumers x with uA(x)  w > uB(x)  pB, or:
x < xAB(w)  rA   w   rB + pB
sA   sB ;
whereas consumers x with xAB(w) < x < xB end-up buying from B.
Instead, when pB is high enough so that xB < xA, a third demand region exists
between xB and xA, in which consumers end-up buying from A. The thresholds for
the first two demand regions are the same as in the market share configuration above.
We start with the first case. If B serves consumers x with xAB(w) < x < xB, its
profit is:
(pB   w)

rB   pB
sB
  rA   w   rB + pB
sA   sB

:
Maximizing with respect to pB yields:
pB (w) =
sA(rB + w)  sB(rA   w)
2sA
: (10)
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We now turn to the negotiation at the wholesale stage. Because A charges to each
consumer x a personalized price of rA  sAx  rB + sBx+ pB(w), the industry profit is:
Z rA w rB+pB(w)
sA sB
0
[rA   sAx  rB + sBx+ pB(w)] dx+pB(w)

rB   pB(w)
sB
  rA   w   rB + pB(w)
sA   sB

;
(11)
with pB(w) given by (10). Maximizing (11) with respect to w yields (the subscript PU
stands for the pricing regime in whichA sets Personalized prices andB aUniform price)42
wPU =
sB [rA(2sA + sB) + rBsA]
2s2A + 5sAsB + s
2
B
:
This market configuration is only valid if xB  xA. Comparing the two thresholds at
the equilibrium values, we obtain that the inequality is fulfilled if and only if:
rB  rAsB(2s
2
A + 4sAsB + s
2
B)
s2A(sA + 2sB)
or, equivalently,
  (2 + 4 + 
2)
1 + 2
: (12)
As  is bounded above by 1, this inequality can only be satisfied if 2(4 + )   1  0
(which is approximately equivalent to   0:473). Inserting w = wPU in (11), the
resulting industry profit is:
PU =
s3Ar
2
B + s
2
AsB(2r
2
A + 3r
2
B   4rArB) + sAs2B(5r2A + 2r2B   8rArB)  s3Br2A
2sB(sA   sB)(2s2A + 5sAsB + s2B)
=
r2A
sA
2 + (2  4+ 32) + 2(5  8+ 22)  3
2(1  )(2 + 5 + 2) :
Compared with the profit from mono distribution, mP , the profit from dual distribu-
tion is larger if and only if:43
  ()  
2 +
q
(1 )(2+5+2)
1+2
1 + 
: (13)
Note that () is increasing in  in the range  2 (0; 0:473) and exceeds 1 for  > 0:473.
As  < 1, the condition   () implies  < 0:473. Moreover, () is indeed larger
than the right-hand side of (12) for  < 0:473. Hence, if the first market configuration
is valid, both firms are active if and only if (13) holds.
We now turn to the second market configuration. In this case, the industry profit
42The maximization problem is strictly concave.
43Because PU is a convex quadratic polynomial in , the equation 

PU  mP = 0 has two roots. The
lower one is below zero, and the larger one is ().
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is: Z rA w rB+pB(w)
sA sB
0
[rA   sAx  rB + sBx+ pB(w)] dx (14)
+pB(w)

rB   pB
sB
  rA   w   rB + pB(w)
sA   sB

+
Z rA
sA
rB pB
sB
[rA   sAx] dx;
with pB(w) again given by (10). Maximizing with respect to w, we obtain that the
second-order condition for an interior solution is fulfilled if and only if 2(4+) 1 > 0,
resulting in a wholesale price of:
rAs
3
B + sAs
2
B(3rA + rB) + s
2
AsB(rA   rB)  rBs3A
s3B + 4s
2
BsA   s3A
:
However, at this wholesale price,B’s demand is negative for 2(4+) 1 > 0. As a con-
sequence, in case the maximization problem is concave, mono distribution is optimal.
Instead, if 2(4+) 1  0, the maximization problem (14) is convex. It follows that w
is optimally either set so high that B is not active, which results in mono distribution,
or that w is set so low that xB  xA.
In the latter case, the first market configuration is valid if (12) holds. Instead, if (12)
is not fulfilled, the optimal w is set such that xB exactly equals xA, or (rB pB(w))=sB =
rA=sA, with pB(w) given by (10). Solving the last equation for w yields w = (sArB  
sBrA)=(sA + sB). The resulting industry profit is:
r2A
sA
1 + 2   2(1  )  2(1 + 4) + 23 + 4
2(1  )(1 + )2 :
Compared with mP , the profit with dual distribution is larger if and only if:
   + (1 + )
r
(1  )
1 + 2
: (15)
However, the right-hand side of (15) is larger than the right-hand side of (12) for all
values of , with 2(4+) 1  0. Since the profit function with xB = xA is only valid if
(12) does not hold, (15) cannot be fulfilled for any admissible value of . Hence, mono
distribution is optimal is this case.
As a consequence, dual distribution is more profitable than mono distribution if
and only if   (), which can only hold if  < 0:473. Note that () is equivalent to
the right-hand side of (2)with () =
q
2+5+2
1+2
. Since:
r
2 + 5 + 2
1 + 2
> 1;
mono distribution is optimal for a larger range in the hybrid regime—i.e., the regime
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in which onlyB charges a uniform price—compared to the symmetric regime in which
both firms charge personalized prices.
Online Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
If firms can negotiate the pricing regime at the wholesale stage, they chose the one that
maximizes the industry profit. As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, UP > 

U ,
regardless of the values of  and . Therefore, firms will never choose the pricing
regime of uniform pricing.
We next compare the two regimes in which A charges personalized prices—i.e.,
the regime in which B charges personalized prices as well (denoted by the subscript
P ) and the regime in which B only charges a uniform price (denoted by the subscript
PU ). If dual distribution is optimal in each of the two regimes, the respective profits
are:
P =
r2A
2sA
 (1 + 3)  4 (1 + ) + (1 + )2 2
 (1  2)
and:
PU =
r2A
sA
+ (2  4+ 32) + 2(5  8+ 22)  3
2(1  )(2 + 5 + 2) :
Taking the difference yields:
P   PU =
r2A
sA
(1 + 3 + 2) ((1 + )  2)2
2(1  2)(2 + 5 + 2) > 0:
Moreover, as shown in Proposition 2, dual distribution is optimal for a larger range in
the regime with personalized pricing of both firms than in the regime in which only A
can charge personalized prices. Because the profit from mono distribution is the same
in both regimes and the profit from dual distribution is higher in case dual distribution
is optimal, it follows that the regime with personalized pricing by both firms (weakly)
dominates the hybrid regime. Therefore, firms do not choose the latter regime.
The preceding arguments imply that firms will either choose the regime in which
they both charge personalized prices or the one in which only B charges personalized
prices. In the latter regime, the industry profit is:
UP =
r2A
sA
 + 22   4   22 + 22 + 2
4 (1  2) :
Instead, whenever both firms offer personalized prices, dual distribution is optimal if:
 > ~()  
 
2 +
p
1  
(1 + )
;
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which, together with  < 1, implies  < ^ = (
p
5  1)=2. The industry profit from dual
distribution is then equal to:
P =
r2A
sA
(1 + 3)  4(1 + ) + 2(1 + )2
2(1  2) :
Therefore:
P > 

UP ,
r2A
sA
(1 + 3)  4(1 + ) + 2(1 + )2
2(1  2) >
r2A
sA
 + 22   4   22 + 22 + 2
4 (1  2)
,  < g ()  1 + 4
3 + 2
:
It follows that dual distribution together with personalized pricing by both firms is
optimal if and only if:

 
2 +
p
1  
(1 + )
   1 + 4
3 + 2
If instead   ~(), then the industry profit with personalized pricing is the mono
distribution profit mP = r
2
A=(2sA), and thus:
UP > 
m
P ()
r2A
sA
 + 22   4   22 + 22 + 2
4 (1  2) >
r2A
2sA
()  >  +
r
 (1  2)
2 + 
or  <   
r
 (1  2)
2 + 
:
Because  > , the only relevant case is:
 > h ()   +
r
 (1  2)
2 + 
:
It is easy to check that 
 
2 +
p
1   = (1 + ) < h () < g () (resp.,   2 +p1   = (1 + ) >
h () > g ()) for  < ~ (resp.,  > ~), where ~ ' 0:248 is the unique solution in (0; ^)
to: p
1  ~ = ~ (3 + 2~) :
It follows that dual distribution together with uniform pricing by A and dual distribu-
tion by B is optimal if and only if:
 > max fg () ; h ()g =
(
g () if   ~;
h () if ~ <  < ^:
It also follows from the preceding analysis that mono distribution is optmal if and
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only if:
 < min
(

 
2 +
p
1  
1 + 
; h () ; 1
)
=
8>><>>:
(2+
p
1 )
1+
if   ~;
h () if ~ <  < ^;
1 if ^ <  < 1:
Online Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4
We start the analysis with the regime in which both firms set uniform prices. If A’s
channel is shut down, B sets the monopoly price in the retail market, equal to rB=2,
and the industry profit is r2B=(4sB). Comparing this profit with the industry profit
under dual distribution, which is given U , yields that mono distribution by B gives a
higher industry profit if and only if:
  UU 
4(1 + )  (1  )p4 + 5
3 + 5
:
It is straightforward to check that this inequality always holds at  = 1 but is never
fulfilled at  = . In addition, UU 2 (0; 1) for all  2 (0; 1), that is UU is in the interior
of the admissible range.
Second, we analyze the pricing regime (UP ). Without the presence of A’s channel,
B extracts the entire surplus in the retail market, which implies that the industry profit
is r2B=(2sB). Instead, with dual distribution, the industry profit is 

UP . Comparing the
two profits yields:
r2B
2sB
 UP ,   UP 
2 +   p3(1 + )(1  )
1 + 2
: (16)
This inequality always holds at the upper bound  = 1. At the lower bound  = , the
inequality is also fulfilled if   1=2. Hence, mono distribution by B is optimal in this
regime for   1=2, and, if (16) holds, also for  < 1=2.
Third, we turn to the regime (PU). Without A’s channel, the industry profit is
r2B=(4sB) because B can only charge a uniform price. Instead, if A’s channel is open,
dual distribution is optimal if and only if:
  
2 +
q
(1 )(2+5+2)
1+2
1 + 
(17)
and leads to a profit of PU ; otherwise, mono distribution by A is optimal with a profit
of mP = r
2
A=(2sA). Comparing 
m
P with the profit from mono distribution by B (i.e.,
r2B=(4sB)) yields that the latter is larger if and only if  
p
2. Because this comparison
is only relevant if (17) does not hold, we need to check if
p
2 is smaller than the right-
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hand side of (17). Thus is true if and only if 0:357 / .
If instead dual distribution is optimal in case A’s channel is open, we obtain:
r2B
4sB
 PU ,   PU 
4(1 + 2)  (1  )p2(2 + 5 + 2)
3 + 8 + 2
: (18)
This threshold is larger than the one of the right-hand side of (17) if and only if 0 
 < 0:357, approximately. Hence, mono distribution by B is optimal if   p2 in case
0:357 <   1, and if (18) holds in case 0   < 0:357.
Finally, proceeding in the same way for the regime (PP ), we obtain that the in-
dustry profit with mono distribution by B is higher than with mono distribution by A
or dual distribution if   p for  > 0:157, and if
  PP  1 
s
1  
2(1 + )
for 0   < 0:157. This shows that in all pricing regimes, mono distribution by B is
optimal for some parameters.
We now compare the ranges for which shutting down A’s channel is optimal in the
four pricing regimes. We start with a comparison of the regimes (PU) with (UU). In
the latter, mono distribution is optimal if   UU holds, whereas in the former mono
distribution by B is optimal if   p2 in case 0:357 <   1, and, if   PU , in case
0   < 0:357. We start with the case 0   < 0:357. The difference:
PU   UU ,
4(1 + 2)  (1  )p2(2 + 5 + 2)
3 + 8 + 2
  4(1 + )  (1  )
p
4 + 5
3 + 5
equals 0 at the lower bound  = 0. Instead, at the upper bound it is approximately
equal to 0:034. The difference is also increasing in , which implies that it is positive
for all  between 0 and 0:357. In the range, 0:357 <   1, the relevant comparison is:
p
2   4(1 + )  (1  )
p
4 + 5
3 + 5
:
It is easy to check that this difference is again equal to 0.034 at the lower bound. At
the upper bound, it is equal to
p
2   1 > 0. It is also increasing for all values of  in
the range between 0:357 and 1. It follows that the range in which mono distribution
by B is optimal in the regime (PU) is a subset of the one in the regime (UU), that is,
RBPU  RBUU .
Next, we compare RBUU with RBPP . In the regime (PP ), mono distribution by B is
optimal if   p for 0:157 <   1, and if   PP for 0   < 0:157. We start again
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with the latter case. The difference:
UU   PP ,
4(1 + )  (1  )p4 + 5
3 + 5
  1 
s
1  
2(1 + )
equals 1=
p
2   1=3 > 0 at  = 0, it is approximately equal to 0:339 at  = 0:157, and
increasing for all values of  between 0 and 0:157. Turning to the range 0:157 <   1,
the relevant comparison is:
4(1 + )  (1  )p4 + 5
3 + 5
 p;
which is approximately equal to 0:339 at  = 0:157, decreasing in  for  2 (0:157; 1],
and equal to 0 at  = 1. It follows that the thresholds above which mono distribution
by B is optimal, are strictly lower in the regime (PP ) than the threshold in the regime
(PU); hence,RBUU  RBPP .
Finally, we compare RBPP with RBUP . In the regime (UP ), mono distribution by B
maximizes the industry profit if   UP , which always holds for   1=2. We start
with the range 0   < 0:157. At the lower bound  = 0, the difference PP   UP
equals
p
3   1   1=p2 = 0:025 > 0, and the upper bound  = 0:157, this difference is
approximately 0:056. The difference is also increasing in  2 [0; 0:157), which implies
that it is positive in the entire range. Turning to the range 0:157 <   1, the relevant
comparison is
p
   UP . This difference is approximately equal to 0:056 at the lower
bound, equals 0 at the upper bound  = 1, and is decreasing in  in the relevant range.
It follows thatRBPP  RBUP .
Online Appendix E: Linear wholesale tariff
In this appendix, we show that our main results carry over to the case with a linear
wholesale tariff. In contrast to the two-part tariff analyzed in the main model, linear
tariffs create double marginalization problems and tend to generate inefficiently high
prices. Yet, because of their simplicity or for fairness reasons,44 linear tariffs are some-
times used in practice.45 We restrict our attention to the two situations in which both
firms can charge only uniform prices and in which both firms can charge personalized
prices. We also simplify the exposition by allocating all bargaining power at the whole-
sale stage to A (i.e., we assume that A makes the wholesale contract offer).46 We then
44Cui et al. (2007) show that a linear wholesale price contract can be efficient if the retailer is inequity
averse when comparing its profit with that of the manufacturer.
45This is, for example, the case of the U.S. pay-TV industry; see Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) and
Crawford et al. (2018).
46The qualitative result are similar if instead B made the offer.
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obtain the following proposition:
Proposition: Suppose that wholesale contracts are restricted to a wholesale price offered
by A. Dual distribution is optimal in case both firms can charge only a uniform retail price. By
contrast, when both firms offer personalized prices, mono distribution is optimal if and only if :
  2 +
p
2(1  )
1 + 
:
The proposition shows that our main insights carry over when considering linear
wholesale prices instead of two-part tariffs. The intuition is the same as before. Dual
distribution expands demand in the low-end segment but triggers competition with
the manufacturer’s own distribution channel. As long as that channel charges a uni-
form price, this competition is not too fierce and can be sufficiently mitigated through
an appropriate wholesale price. Dual distribution is therefore optimal. When instead
both firms offer personalized prices, competition is tougher; mono distribution is then
optimal if B does not add enough value to the industry. Compared to the setting in
which the wholesale contract consists of a two-part tariff, the range in which mono
distribution is optimal is now even larger, as a linear wholesale price contract does not
allow firms to share their joint profits in any way they wish to, which implies that A
obtains a smaller part of B’s profit than with two-part tariffs.
Proof of the proposition:
With dual distribution, the second stage of the game leads, as before, to down-
stream prices given by (7). We now consider the first stage for the two pricing regimes.
Under uniform pricing, the profit function ofA is nowA = DApA+DBw. Inserting
the corresponding demand functions, pA and pB from (7), andmaximizingwith respect
to w, we obtain that the equilibrium wholesale price is (using “” to distinguish from
the equilibrium that arises with two-part tariffs):47
wU =
rAs
2
B + 8rBs
2
A
2sA(8sA + sB)
=
rA
2
8+ 2
8 + 
:
Inserting wU into the profit yields the equilibrium profit with dual distribution:
U =
4s3Ar
2
B + 8s
2
AsBrA(rA   rB)  r2As2B(3sA + sB)
4sAsB(8sA + sB)(sA   sB)
=
r2A
4sA
42 + 8 (1  )  2 (3 + )
 (1  ) (8 + ) :
As in Section 4, it can be checked that demandsDA andDB are both positive atw = wU ,
47The second-order condition is 2sA(8sA+sB)=(sB(4sA sB)2) < 0, implying that the profit function
is concave.
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implying that dual distribution is optimal. Indeed, comparing U with 
m
U = r
2
A=4sA,
yields:
U   mU = mU
4 (   )2
 (1  ) (8 + ) > 0:
We now turn to personalized pricing. As in the case of two-part tariffs, in the range
w  u^, B is inactive and so A cannot obtain more than the mono distribution profit mP .
We thus focus on w  u^, distinguishing again between w  w = rA (  ) and w > w.
We start with the former case. With linear tariffs, the profit function is:
A(w) =
Z x^
0
[w + uA(x)  uB(x)] dx+
Z ~xB(w)
x^
wdx;
which is strictly concave in w:
0A (w) = ~xB (w) + w
d~xB
dw
(w) =
rB   w
sB
  w
sB
=
rB   2w
sB
; (19)
and thus 00A =  2=sB < 0. When instead w > w, A’s profit can be written as:
A (w) =
Z x^
0
w + uA(x)  uB(x)dx+
Z ~xB(w)
x^
wdx+
Z xA
~xB(w)
uA(x)dx:
The first derivative is equal to:
0A (w) = ~xB(w) + [w   uA (~xB (w))]
d~xB
dw
(w)
=
rB   2w + rA
sB
  sA
sB
rB   w
sB
=
rA
sA2

    (1  ) + (1  2) w
rA

:
Hence:
0A  (u^) =
rA
sA
1  
1   ;
0A+ (w) = 
0
  (w) =
rA
sA
(2   ) ;
00A (w) =
1  2
sA2
:
It follows that (w) is strictly concave in w if  > ^ = 1=2 and is weakly convex
otherwise; in addition, 0A (u^) > 0whereas 
0
A (w)  0 if and only if:
  ^ ()  2;
where ^ () increases with  and exceeds 1 for   ^. Furthermore, the profit
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function A (w) and its derivative 0A (w) are both continuous at w = w.
As mentioned above, as long as w  u^, A cannot obtain a higher profit than with
mono distribution. Furthermore, if   ^ (), then 0A (w)  0, implying that dual
distribution cannot be more profitable than mono distribution:
 in the range w  w  u^, the profit function A (w) is increasing, as it is quadratic
and its derivative is non-negative at both ends of the range (namely, 0A (w)  0
and 0A (u^) > 0);
 in the range w  w, the profit function A (w) is again increasing, as it is concave
and its derivative is non-negative at the upper end of the range (namely,0A (w) 
0);
 it follows that the profit achieved under dual distribution cannot exceed A (u^),
which is less profitable than mono distribution.
As already noted, ^ () is increasing in , and satisfies ^ ()  1 for   ^. It
follows that, if   ^, then dual distribution cannot be more profitable than mono
distribution, as we then have ^ ()  1 (> ).
If instead  < ^ and  > ^ (), then 0A (w) < 0 and, in the range w  w, from
(19), A (w) is maximal for wP = rB=2, which lies below w and yields a profit equal to:
P =
2r2AsB + r
2
B(sA + sB)  4rArBsB
4sB(sA   sB) =
r2A
4sA
2 + 2(1 + )  4
(1  ) :
Compared with the profit from mono distribution, mP = r
2
A=2sA, dual distribution
introduces a change in profit equal to:
P   mP = mP

2   4 + 2 (1 + )
2 (1  )   1

= mP
22   4+ (1 + ) 2
2 (1  ) :
The numerator of this expression is a convex quadratic polynomial of  and its roots
are:

2 p2 (1  )
1 + 
and 
2 +
p
2 (1  )
1 + 
:
Furthermore, ^ () lies between these two roots in the relevant range  < ^:

2 
p
2(1 )
1+
^ ()
=
2 p2 (1  )
2 (1 + )
< 1;

2+
p
2(1 )
1+
^ ()
=
2+
p
2(1 )
1+
2
=
2 +
p
2 (1  )
2 (1 + )
> 1;
where the last inequality stems from
p
2 (1  ) > 2 in the relevant range  < ^. It
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follows that dual-distribution is more profitable than mono-distribution if and only if
 < ^ and  exceeds the larger root, that is, if:
 > ~ ()  2 +
p
2 (1  )
1 + 
:
Note that ~ () is increasing in  in the range   ^, and exceeds 1 in the range
  ^. Hence, as  < 1, the condition  > ~ () implies  < ^.
Online Appendix F: Wholesale contract including A’s retail price
In this appendix, we show that our main results carry over to a scenario in which the
manufacturer and the retailer do not only negotiate about the wholesale tariff (i.e., the
wholesale price w and the fixed fee F ) but can also negotiate the manufacturer’s retail
price(s) in the contract. Although this scenario is perhaps less realistic than the one
in our main model—i.e., the scenario requires commitment by the manufacturer to
its retail prices, which may not be credible as retail prices can be changed relatively
quickly and may be difficult to monitor—it is an important robustness check for our
results. The reason is that commitment to A’s retail price(s) allows firms to achieve
higher profits in case of dual distribution due to the fact that competiton is less fierce
than with simultaneous retail price setting. Therefore, one may wonder whether our
result that mono distribution is optimal under personalized pricing may hinge on this
assumption. The next proposition shows that this is not the case. As in Appendix E, we
focus on the two cases in which both firms either set a uniform price or set personalized
prices.
Proposition: Suppose that firms can contract on A’s retail price, in case of uniform pri-
cing, or its retail prices, in case of personalized pricing. If both firms can charge only a uniform
retail price, dual distribution is optimal. By contrast, if both firms offer personalized prices,
mono distribution is optimal if and only if :
  p for  > 3  2
p
2  0:172;
  (3  )
1 + 
for   3  2
p
2  0:172:
As in our main model, dual distribution is optimal in the entire parameter range
if both firms charge a uniform price but mono distribution may be optimal if both
firms charge personalized prices. In both scenarios, the profit with dual distribution is
higher than in the case in which retail prices of both firms are set after the wholesale
contract is negotiated. This is due to the fact that the possibility of commitment to the
retail price by one firm relaxes downstream competition, and leads to higher prices
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and profits: the two firms could negotiate the same retail prices as A would set in case
retail prices are chosen simultaneously by the two firms. Because B’s best response is
the same as in the simultaneous game, this leads to the same industry profit. Therefore,
if firms negotiate different retail prices, a revealed-preference argument implies that
the industry profit must be higher. However, the proposition shows that this effect is
not large enough to overturn our main result: mono distribution is still optimal for 
low enough if both firms can set personalized prices.
Proof of the proposition:
In case of uniform pricing, B’s best response at the retail stage is the same as the
one with simultaneous choice of the retail prices. From the proof of Proposition 2, it is
given by:
pB(pA;w) =
rB + w
2
+
sB (pA   rA)
2sA
:
In the negotiation stage, the two firms maximize the objective function pADA (pA; w) +
pB (pA; w)DB (pA; w)with respect to w and pA. Doing so, we obtain that the maximiza-
tion problem is strictly concave and the solution is:
w =
rAsB
2sA
and pA =
rA
2
:
The resulting industry profit is:
r2AsB + r
2
BsA   2rArBsB
4sB(sA   sB) :
Comparing this profit with U from the proof of Proposition 2 yields that the former is
larger than the latter for all parameter combinations. Since U was already larger than
the profit from mono distribution, we obtain that dual distribution is also optimal if
A’s retail price can be negotiated in the wholesale contract.
We now turn to personalized pricing by both firms. In this case, the industry profit
under mono distribution by A is r2A=(2sA). If A’s personalized prices can be negotiated
in the wholesale contract, the firms can, in addition to choosing mono distribution,
negotiate prices such that either both firms are active or only B receives a positive
demand. We start with the latter case. By setting pA(x)  uA(x) for all x and w = 0,
the industry profit is equivalent to the profit that occurs if only B sells the product and
charges personalized prices—i.e., r2B=(2sB). Comparing this with the profit frommono
distribution by A, we obtain that mono distribution by A is more profitable if and only
if   p.
We next consider the scenario in which both A and B are active. For any w and
pA(x),B’s best response in the retail stage is to set pB(x) = min [pA(x) + uB(x)  uA(x); uB(x)]
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if pB(x)  w and pB(x) = w otherwise. If both firms are active, the industry profit can
be higher than in the two extreme cases of mono distribution by either A or B only if
w 2 (0; u^). If w > u^, B can never add value compared to the case of mono distribution
by A because it cannot sell in the segment x^ < x  x in which it adds value. Instead,
w = 0 can only be optimal if B gets the entire demand. For any w 2 (0; u^), A’s optimal
personalized prices are pA(x)  uA(x) for all x > x^ and pA(x) = w + uA(x)  uB(x) for
all x  x^. These prices allow B to extract the entire consumer surplus from consumers
who obtain a higher value when buying from B than when buying from A but also al-
low A to sell to all consumers who have a higher valuation for A’s product that for that
of B. In addition, A charges the highest prices, given competition from B at the retail
stage. Given these personalized prices, in the negotiation stage the two firms choose w
so as to maximize: Z x^(w)
0
[w + uA(x)  uB(x)] dx+
Z ~xB(w)
x^(w)
uB(x)dx:
This problem is strictly concave, and the unique solution is w = sB(rA  rB)=(sA  sB),
leading to an industry profit of:
r2A
sA
2(1 + )  (4  1  )
2(1  )2 : (20)
Comparing this profit with the one from mono distribution by A yields that it is larger
if and only if:
 >
(3  )
1 + 
:
It is easy to check that for these values of , the optimal w is indeed below u^.
Finally, comparing the profit given by (20) with the one in which only B is active,
we obtain that the former is larger than the latter if   (1 + )=(3   ). Solving the
expression (3  )=(1 + ) = (1 + )=(3  ) for  yields  = 3  2p2  0:172.48 The
result of the proposition follows.
Online Appendix G: Comparison of wholesale prices across regimes
Under uniform pricing, the equilibrium wholesale price is given by:
wUU =
sB
2sA
4sA(rA + rB) + rAsB
4sA + 5sB
=
rA
2
4(1 + ) + 
4 + 5
;
48This threshold can also be obtained by equalizing (3  )=(1 + ) andp.
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whereas in the hybrid regime in which only B can charge personalized prices the
wholesale price is given by:
wUP =
sB
2
rA + rB
sA + sB
=
rA
2
1 + 
1 + 
:
Hence:
wUP   wUU =
rA
2 (  )
2 (1 + ) (4 + 5)
> 0;
where the inequality follows from  > .
When both firms charge personalized prices, the wholesale price is either so large
that B does not serve any consumer, or equal to:
wPP =
sBrA
sA + sB
=
rA
1 + 
;
which satisfies:
wPP   wUP =
rA
1 + 
  rA
2
1 + 
1 + 
=
rA
2
1  
1 + 
> 0:
Therefore, regardless of whether mono or dual distribution is optimal when both firms
charge personalized prices, the wholesale price in this symmetric regime is higher than
in the regime in which only B charges personalized prices.
Finally, we compare the wholesale prices in the symmetric regime in which both
firms charge personalized prices with the ones in the hybrid regime in which only A
charges personalized prices. From Proposition 2, we know that in the hybrid pricing
regime, mono distribution is optimal for a larger range than in the symmetric pricing
regime. Hence, if dual distribution is optimal in the symmetric regime but mono distri-
bution in the hybrid regime, the wholesale price in the latter regime is larger. If instead
mono distribution is optimal in both regimes, the wholesale price is the same.
It remains to compare the wholesale prices in case dual distribution is optimal in
both regimes. If dual distribution is optimal in the hybrid regime, the equilibrium
wholesale price is:
wPU =
rA (2 +  + )
(2 + 5 + 2)
:
Taking the difference between wPU and w

PP yields:
wPU   wPP =
((1 + )  2)
(1 + )(2 + 5 + 2)
;
which is strictly increasing in . Inserting the lower bound for  given by () into the
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right-hand side of the last equation yields:
2p
(1 + )(1 + 2)(2 + 5 + 2)
;
which is strictly positive. Therefore, wPU   wP > 0 for all admissible parameters at
which these prices occur in equilibrium.
As a consequence, we obtain a clear ranking of the wholesale prices:
wUU < w

UP < w

PP  wPU :
Online Appendix H: Size ranges for mono distribution by either firm
In this appendix, we compare the parameter range in which mono distribution by
either of the two firms is optimal for the pricing regimes of uniform pricing by both
firms and personalized pricing by both firms. We start with the former regime. From
Proposition 2, mono distribution by A is never optimal in this regime, and from the
proof of Proposition 4, mono distribution by B is optimal if:
  4(1 + )  (1  )
p
4 + 5
3 + 5
: (21)
Therefore, dual distribution is optimal if (21) does not hold. Instead, in the regime in
which both firms charge personalized prices, we obtain by combining the results of
Proposition 2 and the proof of Proposition 4, that dual distribution is optimal only if
 / 0:157 and:

 
2 +
p
1  
1 + 
<  < 1 
s
1  
2(1 + )
: (22)
Taking the difference between the right-hand sides of (21) and (22) yields:
4(1 + )  (1  )p4 + 5
3 + 5
 
 
1 
s
1  
2(1 + )
!
=
(3 + 5)
p
2(1  2)  2(1  2)  p4 + 5   1
2(1  )(3 + 5) ;
which is positive for all  / 0:157. Therefore, dual distribution occurs for a larger
parameter range in the regime with uniform pricing by both firms. Conversely, the
parameter range in which mono distribution by either firm occurs is larger in the re-
gime with personalized by both firms—i.e.,RA=BUU  RA=BPP .
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Online Appendix I: Generalization of Proposition 2, Part (i)
In this appendix, we generalize part (i) of Proposition 2 to an extended setting in which
consumers with unit demand have valuations uA (x) and uB (x) for the products of
the two firms, where uA () and uB () are both twice continuously differentiable, x is
distributed according to a twice continuously differentiable c.d.f. G (x) over R+ and:
 8x 2 R+, u0A (x) < u0B (x) < 0;
 ui (xi) = 0 for some xi > 0; and
 uA (x^) = uB (x^) > 0 for some x^ > 0.
This implies that, as in our baseline model, the curves uA (x^) and uB (x^) intersect
exactly once, and this intersection occurs in the positive quadrant.
Let:
Dmi (pi)  G
 
u 1i (pi)

;
denote the monopolistic demand for firm i’s product:
pmi  argmax
pi
piD
m
i (pi) ;
denote firm i’s monopoly price:
xmi  u 1i (pmi ) ;
denote the location of the associated marginal consumer, and:
qmi  Dmi (pmi ) = G (xmi ) and mi  pmi qmi ;
denote the monopoly output and profit, respectively. Our working assumption is that
B would seek to serve more consumers than A in these monopoly situations:
Assumption A: B’s monopoly profit function is strictly quasi-concave and qmB >
qmA .
Let wm  uB (xmA ). For w  wm, there exists a continuation equilibrium in which A
charges its monopoly price, pmA , and B does not serve any consumer (e.g., by charging
pB = w
m). If instead w < wm, both firms can obtain a positive market share: A then
faces a demand:
DA (pA; pB)  G
 
 1 (pA   pB)

;
where:
(x)  uA (x)  uB (x) ;
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whereas B faces a demand given by:
DB (pA; pB)  DmB (pB) DA (pA; pB) :
For the sake of exposition, we will assume that there then exists an equilibrium where
both firms obtain a positive market share, which is moreover “well-behaved”:
Assumptions B: For any w  wm, there exists a unique downstream equilibrium,
(peA (w) ; p
e
B (w)), where p
e
A (w) and p
e
B (w) are continuous and increasing in w, and such
that peA (w
m) = pmA and p
e
B (w
m) = wm.
We have:
Proposition: Under Assumptions A and B, dual distribution is the unique optimal distri-
bution strategy under uniform pricing.
Proof: We first consider the regime in which both firms charge a uniform price.
Starting from a situation in which the firms negotiate w = wm, and thus A obtains
mA , consider a small reduction in the wholesale price from w
m to w < wm, together
with a fixed fee, F (w), designed to appropriate B’s profit (or almost all of it, to ensure
acceptance). A then obtains (almost all of) the industry profit, which can be expressed
as:
(w) = A (w) + B (w) ;
where:
A (w) = p
e
A (w)DA (p
e
A (w) ; p
e
B (w)) + wDB (p
e
A (w) ; p
e
B (w)) + F (w) ;
B (w) = [p
e
B (w)  w]DB (peA (w) ; peB (w))  F (w) :
By deviating from the downstream equilibrium and charging:
p^A (w) = p
e
B (w)  uB (xmA ) + uA (xmA ) = pmA + peB (w)  wm;
A would maintain its output of qmA , and generate an output q^B = D
m
B (p
e
B (w))   qmA for
B. Therefore:
A (w)  p^A (w)DA (p^A (w) ; peB (w)) + wDB (p^A (w) ; peB (w)) + F (w)
= [pmA + p
e
B (w)  wm] qmA + w [DmB (peB (w))  qmA ] + F (w)
= mA + [p
e
B (w)  w   wm] qmA + wDmB (peB (w)) + F (w) :
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Likewise, noting that B could always choose to deviate from the downstream equilib-
rium and charge pB = w, we have:
B (w)   F (w) :
Adding these two inequalities yields (recalling that (w) = A (w) + B (w)):
(w)  mA   (w)  [peB (w)  w   wm] qmA + wDmB (peB (w)) :
Note that  (wm) = 0 because peB (w
m) = wm and DmB (w
m) = G (xmA ) = q
m
A . Taking the
derivative of  (w) and evaluating it at w = wm, we obtain (again using peB (w
m) = wm
and qmA = D
m
B (w
m)):
0 (wm) =

dpeB
dw
(w)  1

qmA +D
m
B (w
m) + w
dDmB
dpeB
(peB (w))
dpeB
dw
(w)
=
dpeB
dw
(w)

DmB (w
m) + wm
dDmB
dpeB
(wm)

;
where the expression within bracket is negative from Assumption A.49 It follows that
a reduction of w below wm is strictly profitable, implying that dual distribution is the
unique optimal mode of distribution.
Turning to the hybrid regime in which B charges personalized prices, the same
logic as in the main text can be applied. In particular, setting pA = pA and w = p

B,
where pA and p

B are the equilibrium retail prices under uniform pricing, delivers a
higher industry profit than dual distribution with uniform pricing, and therefore also
a higher profit than mU .
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